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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Cranberry Scare of 1959: 
 
The Beginning of the End of the Delaney Clause. (December 2010) 
 
Mark Ryan Janzen, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
 
M.A., Texas Tech University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jonathan Coopersmith 
 
 
The cranberry scare of 1959 was the first food scare in the United States 
involving food additives to have a national impact. It was also the first event to test the 
Delaney clause, part of a 1958 amendment to the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act 
prohibiting cancer-causing chemicals in food. 
Although lasting only a few weeks, the scare significantly affected the cranberry 
industry and brought the regulation of chemical residues in food to the national stage. 
Generated by a complex interaction of legislation, technology, media, and science, the 
scare had far-reaching effects in all areas of the cranberry industry, food legislation, and 
the perception of the public toward additives and residues in their food. The ripples 
caused by the scare permanently altered the cranberry industry and, after numerous 
subsequent scares and challenges to the law, eventually resulted in the repeal of the 
Delaney clause. 
The goal of this investigation was to demonstrate how the social, scientific, and 
political climates in the United States interacted and led to such an event. It shows how 
  
iv 
science, politics, and contemporary social anxiety combined, with technology as a 
catalyst, and how the resulting scare left significant marks on the development of both 
legislation and industry. It also improves our understanding of this seminal event in 
American social history by exploring the events surrounding the scare, as well as by 
comparing the perspectives and reactions of the public, the Eisenhower administration, 
the cranberry industry, and other industries affected by the scare and its aftermath. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The risk of disruption of agriculture and the food industries if the 
recognized health hazard gets blown out of proportion by ‗scare 
journalism‘ before sound answers from all points of view can be found.1 
 
The cranberry scare of 1959, a nationwide food scare concerning contamination 
in cranberries by the synthetic chemical aminotriazole (C2H4N4), was an important 
historical event for several reasons. As the first major food scare involving chemically 
contaminated food, it served as a model for social and governmental interaction on such 
issues. The scare was also a first test of the functionality and acceptability of the 1958 
Delaney clause, a specific clause in the 1958 Food Additives Amendment that banned 
any use of cancer causing chemicals in food for human consumption. The clause was 
named for Congressman James Delaney (D-NY) who, as a staunch supporter of the 
protection of food from chemical contamination, was the primary force behind its 
passage. Although the immediate impact of the cranberry scare on American minds was 
brief and there was no known physical harm resulting from aminotriazole exposure, the 
event demonstrated a critically important combination of several social factors 
generating a broad, society-wide response. 
 
 
______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of American History. 
 
1 Untitled memorandum, January 31, 1959, Don Paarlberg Files, box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers 
(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas), 1. 
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Administrative and public responses, as well as media characterizations, placed 
the notion of a ―food scare‖ into the American public consciousness and helped set the 
tone for media, administrative, and public interactions in future scares. Scares involving 
adulteration of food, chemical contamination, and technological misunderstanding 
became common in American society. General distrust of chemicals and their presence 
in food, as well as distrust of the motivations of government and industry, generated 
cranberry scare-like responses into the 21
st
 century. The cranberry scare was an early 
manifestation of that collective concern, and the combination of circumstances 
surrounding it remains a good example of why scares continued to occur.
2
 
The cranberry scare was the beginning of the end of the Delaney clause. As the 
first test of the clause‘s complete restriction against the use of carcinogens in food, the 
cranberry scare demonstrated that the no-tolerance concept was politically and 
scientifically controversial and its administrative handling needed improvement. 
Consideration of the problem took 40 years, encompassed numerous carcinogen scares, 
and witnessed the creation of several new regulatory bodies, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) in 1972, and the Food Safety Quality Service (FSQS) in 
1977, which became the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in 1981. The repeal 
of the Delaney clause in 1996 altered Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and EPA 
 
2 Julian Morris and Roger Bate, Fearing Food: Risk, Health and Environment (Boston, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, 
1999), 141-67. 
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regulatory procedures to allow for scientific judgment in setting tolerances, supporting 
the original scientific arguments against its addition to the Food Additives Amendment. 
The Eisenhower administration dealt with the cranberry scare. Well before the 
scare, the Eisenhower administration was aware of the potential problem of chemicals in 
food as well as the possible consequences to the public and industries. The White House 
predicted the panic caused by the scare while discussing potential problems with the 
discovery of harmful chemical residues in milk, but offered no immediate solutions to 
the problem.
3
 
This analysis is divided into several chapters designed to demonstrate the 
interaction of the historical forces generating the scare. In Chapter II, a history of the 
cranberry industry provides background for the social and economic circumstances of 
the scare. Chapter III discusses the legislative genesis of the cranberry scare, explains the 
science and technologies involved in cranberry production and shows how they played 
crucial roles in the scare. An exploration of the American social consciousness of 1959 
in Chapter IV helps understand how various factors combined to create a public panic. A 
description of the events during the scare ties the factors together in Chapter V, and 
Chapter VI offers an analysis of the media and public responses to the scare. The 
conclusion discusses the aftermath of the scare and some of the historical ripples it 
generated. Appendix A provides a timeline of the major events of the scare, and 
 
3 Confidential memorandum, January 31, 1959, Don Paarlberg Files, box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 
Papers (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene Kansas), 1. 
  
4 
Appendix B presents a list of subsequent Delaney-like scares through repeal of the 
clause in 1996. 
Both primary and secondary sources contain valuable evidence of how and why 
the cranberry scare occurred. The secondary sources discuss what happened during the 
scare but rarely look at why it happened. A variety of books and journal articles in 
history, anthropology, science, and medicine mention the cranberry scare in reference to 
the Delaney clause or carcinogen regulation, but few mention more than the proximity of 
the scare to Thanksgiving and some damage to the cranberry industry. 
Three works, Paul Eck‘s The American Cranberry (1990), Dave Engel‘s 
Cranmoor: The Cranberry El Dorado (2004) and Joseph Thomas‘ Cranberry Harvest: A 
History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts (1990) provide a good history of 
cranberries and the cranberry industry.
4
 Works, such as Wallace Janssen‘s The U.S. 
Food and Drug Law: How It Came, How It Works (1985) and Meredith Hickman‘s The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (2003), focus on the history of the FDA and food 
law in the United States.
5
 
Many books and articles look at the science, social and technology issues 
involved in the scare. Articles in scientific journals, such as Science, occasionally 
include some basic analysis of the events, with most focusing on the Delaney clause and 
 
4 Paul Eck, The American Cranberry (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Dave Engel, Cranmoor: The 
Cranberry Eldorado (Rudolph, WI: River City Memoirs, 2004); Joseph D. Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of 
Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, (New Bedford, MA: Spinner Publications, 1990).  
5 Wallace F. Janssen and United States. Food and Drug Administration., The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came, 
How It Works (Rockville, MD: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Service, Food and Drug Administration, 1985) and 
Meredith A. Hickmann, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003). 
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its merits regarding chemical analysis for human consumption.
6
 Biomedical journals, 
such as the American Journal of Hospital Pharmacology, mention the scare as historical 
background for the use of cranberries as a healthful alternative for several medical 
conditions.
7
 Legal journals, such as the California Law Review and the Food and Drug 
Law Journal, consistently focus on the scare as the first test of the Delaney clause in its 
long and controversial history.
8
 No single work focuses entirely on the scare. 
Five major secondary works provide the historical background of food and the 
general state of fear concerning food in the United States. Andrea Arnold and Jay 
Sandlin‘s Fear of Food: Environmentalist Scams, Media Mendacity and the Law of 
Disparagement (1990), Madeleine Ferrières Mad Cow, Sacred Cow: A History of Food 
Fears (2006), Michelle Stacey‘s Consumed: Why Americans Love, Hate, and Fear Food 
(1994), and Julian Morris and Roger Bate‘s Fearing Food: Risk, Health, and 
Environment (1999) develop the concept of how and why people fear food in different 
ways.
9
 Corey Robin‘s Fear: The History of a Political Idea (2004) discusses the 
connection between fear and politics.
10
 
The most illuminating resources detailing the cranberry scare and its background 
are primary sources. Papers from the Eisenhower Presidential Library provide detailed 
 
6 T. H. Jukes and C. B. Shaffer, "Antithyroid Effects of Aminotriazole," Science 132, no. 3422 (1960), 296-7. 
7 B. G. Hughes and L. D. Lawson, "Nutritional Content of Cranberry Products," Am J Hosp Pharm 46, no. 6 (1989). 
8 Charles H. Blank, "The Delaney Clause: Technical Naïveté and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public 
Health Policies," California Law Review 62, no. 4 (1974); Frederick H. Degnan and W. Gary Flamm, "Living with 
and Reforming the Delaney Clause," Food and Drug Law Journal 50, no. 2 (1995). 
9 Andrea Arnold and Jay Sandlin, Fear of Food: Environmentalist Scams, Media Mendacity, and the Law of 
Disparagement, 1st ed. (Bellevue, WA: Free Enterprise Press : Distributed by Merrill Press, 1990); Madeleine 
Ferrières, Sacred Cow, Mad Cow: A History of Food Fears, Arts and Traditions of the Table (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006); Michelle Stacey, Consumed: Why Americans Love, Hate, and Fear Food (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1994); Morris and Bate, Fearing Food: Risk, Health and Environment. 
10 Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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information on the administrative reaction to the scare, as well as a view of the public 
response through letters and telegrams. Eisenhower Library documents include not only 
Presidential documents, but also documents bearing on the actions of Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Arthur Flemming, Secretary of 
Agriculture Ezra Benson, and other cabinet members. George Kistiakowski‘s  A Scientist 
at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for 
Science and Technology (1976) offers personal insights into the scare from an individual 
who was directly involved.
11
 Documents from the pre-Presidential collections of the 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library and the Richard M. Nixon Presidential 
Library provide perspectives on Congressional activity and support during the scare. The 
papers of Joseph Delaney, in the M.E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and 
Archives of the University at Albany, State University of New York, clarify his actions 
in creating and defending the Delaney clause.  
Because the media reported the scare, newspapers are a primary source of 
information on public and media response. Suzanne White‘s dissertation ―Chemistry and 
Controversy: Regulating Chemicals in Food, 1883-1959,‖ was important for 
understanding FDA actions during the scare.
12
 Many individual sections of the U.S. 
Code, as well as related hearings and inquiries, were critical to understanding the scare. 
Most of the information on the perspective of the cranberry industry and Ocean Spray 
comes from documents in the Wisconsin State Cranberry Growers Association archives 
 
11 George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special 
Assistant for Science and Technology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
12 Suzanne Rebecca White and Emory University., "Chemistry and Controversy: Regulating the Use of Chemicals in 
Foods, 1883-1959" (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1994.). 
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in Wisconsin Rapids and Edward Lipman‘s Labor of Love: My Life’s Work with 
Cranberries and Ocean Spray (1997).
13
 Secondary sources, such as Sharon Friedman, 
Sharon Dunwoody and Carol Rogers‘ Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of 
New and Controversial Science and Ann Crigler‘s The Psychology of Political 
Communication helped to understand media interactions and risk assessment.
14
 
This thesis adds to the history of the cranberry scare by going beyond description 
of the facts and events of the scare to consider the deeper roots of the scare in science, 
contemporary social tension, and political maneuvering. It incorporates information on 
the social environment in the late 1950s, the background of food legislation in the United 
States, and media technologies into the understanding of why the scare occurred. 
Consideration of the interrelationship between cancer fears, the Delaney Provision, 
scientific analysis, and media technology, as well as the perspectives of the Eisenhower 
administration and the cranberry industry are pivotal to our understanding of the 
cranberry scare as a pivotal event. Without investigation and understanding of these 
contributing factors, the cranberry scare remains a one-dimensional historical footnote 
largely overshadowed by international political struggles, wars, national race issues, and 
regional disasters.
 
13 Edward Voorhees Lipman and Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc., Labor of Love: My Life's Work with Cranberries and 
Ocean Spray (New Brunswick, NJ: The author, 1997). 
14 Sharon M. Friedman, Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science (Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999); Ann N. Crigler, The Psychology of Political Communication (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1996). 
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CHAPTER II 
ENVIRONMENT AND CULTIVATION OF THE AMERICAN CRANBERRY 
 This chapter explores the history of the American cranberry, its cultivation, and 
the bog environment. Much of the background of the cranberry scare of 1959 revolved 
around the environment and the plant‘s biology, which dictated the circumstances in 
which farmers operated. The biology of the plant and the history of its cultivation help 
explain why an herbicide like aminotriazole became the focus of attention in a cancer 
scare.  
 
Biology and environment 
 The genus Vaccinium is a large and varied group of plants, including blueberries, 
cowberries, snowberries, and cranberries. Although similar in form and development, 
each has different environmental and nutritional requirements and tends to be very 
sensitive to changes in environmental conditions. Varieties of cranberry are found all 
over the world from North America to Europe and Asia. Varieties include the 
lignonberry (Vaccinium vitis-idaea) in Europe and the small cranberry (Vaccinium 
oxycoccus) throughout Europe and Asia.
15
 
 The American version of the cranberry (Vaccinium macrocarpon) grows wild 
throughout the northeastern United States and southern Canada. Its natural range extends 
from Newfoundland south to Appalachian Tennessee and as far west as Wisconsin. 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maine, Wisconsin, Washington and Oregon dominate 
 
15 Eck, The American Cranberry, 43-5. 
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cranberry production. West coast cranberries are outside the natural range of the 
American cranberry and are universally transplanted. V. macrocarpon is the only 
commercially cultivated species of cranberry, with more than 90% of the producing bogs 
within the United States, and is the primary source for cranberry juice and sauces on the 
worldwide market (See Figure 1).
16
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the main cranberry growing regions in the United States 
 
 
 
16 Ibid., 43-4. 
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 The large American cranberry is a perennial evergreen vine that produces low, 
dense, and trailing patches of vegetation. The woody stemmed vines consist of several 
lateral runners, which can exceed two meters if left undisturbed. Periodic vertical stems 
originate from the leaf axils and often reach five to twenty centimeters in height. Half of 
such uprights develop several flowers along their length, but the rest of the uprights 
remain infertile. Each flower can produce one berry, although growers consider two 
berries per upright, or roughly one-third of the flowers, productive.
17
 
 Regional variations in productivity and acreage under cultivation shaped the 
market and the relative impact of technologies and agricultural innovations. The 
Wisconsin growing region was often the first region to adopt new technologies and to 
implement new growing and harvesting practices because of its large natural acreage and 
the freedom to experiment with new techniques without disturbing production. More 
established growing areas, such as those in Massachusetts, were too widely dispersed to 
effectively apply many new technologies without extensive bog redesign. This trend 
toward technological integration resulted in significantly higher average annual yields 
per acre from Wisconsin bogs.
18
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Ibid., 49-55. 
18 Engel, Cranmoor: The Cranberry Eldorado, 110-25. 
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Table 1: Cranberry-producing acreage by state, 1948-1969 
 
Growing Region Acres/percent of total production 
1948-57 1958 1959 1969 
Massachusetts 14,080/58% 12,900/62% 12,800/60% 11,100/52% 
New Jersey 5,320/22% 2,500/12% 2,800/13% 3,000/14% 
Wisconsin 3,630/15% 4,100/20% 4,200/20% 5,400/25% 
Washington 790/3% 900/4% 1,000/5% 1,000/5% 
Oregon 422/2% 520/2% 540/2% 745/4% 
Average total 24,242 20,920 21,340 21,185 
19
  
Production in all of the growing regions grew steadily from the 1940s through 
the scare. The relative percentages of the overall crop generated by each region shifted to 
varying degrees, with a large decrease in the Massachusetts region and a large increase 
in the Wisconsin region (See Tables 1 and 2). Technologically advanced bogs in 
Wisconsin outpaced older bogs on the East Coast, despite Wisconsin‘s smaller cultivated 
acreage. The cranberry industry experienced a steady decline in acreage harvested from 
the boom times of World War I, when wartime consumption drove prices to all-time 
highs, but the steadily increasing productivity of the remaining acreage meant increased 
overall production. The 1959 scare increased this acreage reduction trend, forcing the 
industry to its lowest point since 1900.
20
 
 
 
 
 
19 United States. Dept. of Agriculture., Agricultural Statistics, 1936- ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.), 
1960, 180-1; ibid., 1975, 231. 
20 Eck, The American Cranberry, 19-28. 
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Table 2: Cranberry production by state, 1948-1969 
  
Growing Region 100 lb. barrels /percent of total production 
1948-57 1958 1959 1969 
Massachusetts 558,100/57% 598,000/51% 610,000/52% 755,000/41% 
Wisconsin 256,100/26% 389,000/33% 405,000/35% 746,000/41% 
New Jersey 85,900/9% 89,000/8% 110,000/9% 160,000/9% 
Washington 53,460/5% 57,300/5% 94,500/8% 105,000/6% 
Oregon 25,470/3% 32,300/3% 44,000/4% 57,100/3% 
Total production 979,030 1,165,600 1,263,500 1,823,100 
21
 
 Cranberries have very specific environmental and nutritional requirements which 
limit them to only a few natural locations. In particular they require peat bogs with 
acidic soil, consistent seasonal water availability, and good drainage characteristics for 
optimal growing environments. The shallow root structure of the vines thrives best in 
thin sandy soils, generally consisting of multiple layers of sand and decomposing 
vegetation. Relatively minimal nutritional requirements make large-scale fertilization 
unnecessary.
22
 
 Pests, competition with other plant species, disease, and spring frosts are the 
most common problems in cultivating a cranberry bog. Numerous insects, mammals and 
birds feed on the ripe berries as well as the plants themselves. Other bog plants, 
including grasses, poison ivy, and asters, compete with the cranberry for nutrients, 
sunlight, and water. Bacterial and fungal diseases were also common in cranberry 
 
21 United States. Dept. of Agriculture., Agricultural Statistics, 1960, 180-81; ibid., 1970, 231. 
22 Eck, The American Cranberry, 136-40. 
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patches. All four problems could seriously impair the productivity of a natural or 
constructed cranberry bog.
23
 
Optimum growth temperatures depend on the vine‘s stage of development. 
Cranberry vines, normally very cold resistant, were prone to frost damage at certain 
times in their developmental cycle. They require a certain number of hours between 32 
and 45 degrees Fahrenheit to break their dormancy cycle and begin their flowering 
cycle, but a frost at the wrong time could reduce productivity. The vines also require 
significant periods of dryness and warmer temperatures to complete their cycle and to 
produce fruit.
24
 
 The long-term sustainability of a cranberry bog depends on the quality and 
preservation of its wetland resources. Bogs naturally suitable for cranberry development 
are commonly part of swamp and wetland ecosystems. Complex systems of flood and 
drainage control are necessary to maintain the water quality while providing enough 
water for cranberry production. Such regions, which are common in central Wisconsin 
and along the Eastern United States, are very sensitive environmentally and demand 
careful management to protect both the cranberry environment and that of the supporting 
flora and fauna.
25
 
 
 
 
23 Byron S. Peterson, Chester E. Cross, and Nathaniel Tilden, The Cranberry Industry in Massachusetts (Boston, MA: 
Dept. of Agriculture, Division of Markets, 1968), 16-52. 
24 Eck, The American Cranberry, 104-9. 
25 John Harker et al., Cranberry Agriculture in Maine : A Grower's Guide, (Orono, ME: University of Maine 
Cooperative Extension, 1997), Chapter 12, 1-30. 
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Consumption and cultivation 
 The American cranberry has been an important food source for every recorded 
group living near North American cranberry-growing regions, as well as a profitable 
crop for more than two centuries. Native Americans, colonists, and generations of 
Americans have valued their taste, healthful properties, and natural abundance. As a 
traditional holiday food, cranberries have held a special place in American social 
history.
26
 
The first known use of the word "cranberries" in English occurred in a letter by 
the missionary John Eliot in 1647.
27
 The word cranberries, originally ―craneberries‖, 
came from the appearance of the plant‘s flowers, which closely resembled the heads of 
cranes. The fruit was highly sought after by cranes and other birds of the coastal regions, 
and it would have been natural to associate the two. In 1617, Captain John Smith 
mentioned an unknown variety of red berry in his log. Growing abundantly in the area 
that would become Massachusetts, they were likely cranberries. Cranberries were also 
referred to by early Americans as bearberries, reflecting the dominant wildlife consumer 
of the ripe berries.
28
 
 Early American documents included descriptions of several Native American 
uses of the cranberry. The native fruit was considered an important staple for the peoples 
who had access to bogs and was the source of a distinctive dye. The berries could be 
stored easily for long periods, and provided nutritious winter food. Native Americans ate 
 
26 Brownstone, Cecily, Wisconsin Rapids Tribune, ―Be Different With Cranberries,‖ p. 9,  November 9, 1959 
27 Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, 18. 
28 Eck, The American Cranberry, 1-3. 
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the berries in raw, dried, and processed form. Pemmican, a mixture of cranberries and 
ground meat or fish made into dry cakes, became a common food on the frontier. 
Succotash, a mixture of corn, beans and cranberries, was a common traditional dish 
throughout the Northeast. Northeastern tribes, such as the Delaware, considered the 
cranberry a symbol of peace and friendship. The giving and eating of cranberries was a 
central element of any native feast of peace and community.
29
 
 Cranberry consumption and use patterns by early settlers closely followed those 
of Native Americans. Early communities learned to use and trade their cranberry 
resources. A barrel or two of cranberries could bring a handsome sum and supplement a 
farming family‘s income in a subsistence environment. Cranberries often sold well in 
areas that did not have easy access to natural bogs and had large populations willing to 
use the berries.
30
 
The association of cranberries with fall feasting was not coincidental. Cranberries 
were typically harvested from September through November, depending upon the 
latitude and the variety of berry. Although there was no specific record of cranberries 
being a part of the first Thanksgiving feast, the fact that the berries were important to the 
native diet and food culture indicates they probably were present at such a momentous 
gathering.
31
 
Cranberries were known to have significant medicinal properties in addition to 
their nutritional value. As a rich source of vitamin C and other nutrients, cranberries 
 
29 Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, 18-25. 
30 Eck, The American Cranberry, 1-13. 
31 Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, 19-21. 
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were a good means of preventing the vitamin deficiency disease scurvy. Slightly laxative 
and mildly antibiotic, cranberries were common remedies for diarrhea, dysentery, and 
dropsy. Native Americans knew that poultices of crushed berries were effective against 
some bacterial skin infections and inflammatory tumors, commonly known as erysipelas 
or St. Anthony‘s fire, well before any medical understanding of antibacterial substances 
developed.
32
 
 One major element of the early economics of cranberry gathering was that bogs 
were generally not useful for other forms of agriculture. Swampy and subject to periodic 
floods, the land was difficult to drain and not suitable for most crops. Many areas that 
supported cranberry bogs were also mined for iron ore, which formed naturally within 
the layers of peat as they filtered mineral-rich water. These sources of iron kept the early 
colonial forges running until colonists discovered larger traditional mines. Competition 
for land capable of producing both cranberries and valuable iron might have encouraged 
colonists to cultivate berries by exposing them to the berry‘s unique environment.33 
 Cranberries quickly became an important gathered crop and were commonly 
exported to other colonies and England. Early legal concerns over ownership and land 
rights were common. There were laws against early picking, and some communities 
imposed fines for possession of berries out of season. Both healthful and profitable, 
cranberries moved quickly from a native novelty to a community necessity.
34
 
 
32 Charlotte Erichsen-Brown, Medicinal and Other Uses of North American Plants : A Historical Survey with Special 
Reference to the Eastern Indian Tribes (New York: Dover Publications, 1989), 206-7. 
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 The earliest mentions of cranberry gathering by European settlers were always as 
community activities. Whole communities turned out to harvest cranberries. The picking 
of a ripe cranberry bog could last for days, and often took on a festival atmosphere. The 
labor-intensive activity of picking, cleaning, sorting, and packing the berries required 
many hands, and the processes changed very little through the 1700s and 1800s. 
Individuals involved in the picking were often paid in cranberries. Low-cost immigrant 
labor, largely of British and central European origin, in the early to mid-1800s took 
many of the tasks out of the hands of the general community. Some of the earliest 
commercialized cranberry growing efforts date from this period when cheap labor was 
combined with improved growing methods.
35
 
 The earliest known cranberry cultivation efforts date from 1810. Henry Hall, a 
farmer, entrepreneur, and scientist, of Dennis, Massachusetts, recorded detailed 
observations of changes in the growth patterns and productivity of cranberries in 
response to environmental changes, such as wind-blown sand and periodic flooding. He 
also experimented with transplanting cuttings from one area to another to determine the 
best locations for maximum productivity. Hall‘s methodical development of an 
understanding of the cranberry and its environment led to the beginning of the 
industry.
36
 
Hall‘s discoveries made commercial bog development possible, and the number 
of bogs in Massachusetts skyrocketed over the next few decades. An 1855 agricultural 
 
35 Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, 13-20, 30-32. 
36 Eck, The American Cranberry, 4-5. 
  
18 
census of Barnstable County, Massachusetts, clearly shows how popular and lucrative 
cranberries were becoming. Growers devoted an estimated half of the available 
cranberry-producing acreage to cranberries and cranberry research.
37
 
 Large-scale cranberry cultivation produced several environmental problems, 
which Hall learned to control. Experimentation with new bog development and 
harvesting methods drastically changed the local environment. As the natural plant 
diversity of the bogs decreased, insect and plant pests became increasingly damaging, as 
in many mono-crop endeavors. Without all of the natural plant and animal factors to 
provide barriers to disease and predation, the cranberries were too exposed to produce 
effectively. This led to the development of both natural and artificial repellents, 
insecticides and herbicides.
38
 
 Early surveys of the New England flora recorded more than fifty sub-species of 
V. macrocarpon. Many were named for the appearance of the ripe berries, such as the 
bell, bugle, and cherry varieties. Hall and his associates selected several varieties for 
intensive cultivation based on their ripe color, size, general productivity, and resistance 
to insects and climate changes. Early Blacks, named for their early onset and very dark 
color, and three other variants, Howes, McFarlins and Searles, make up the ―big four,‖ 
which have dominated the market since the turn of the twentieth century.
39
 Family lines 
played an important part in the development of the cranberry industry as well as in the 
history of the crop. Early farmers named some popular cultivars for their originators, and 
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some of those original families still owned and operated bogs in the 1950s as family 
businesses tracing their lineage back many generations.
40
 
 Cranberry cultivation in Wisconsin traces its history back to 1861, with the first 
laws restricting unauthorized picking of wild berries. Wisconsin bogs were perfectly 
located to serve the Midwest and Pacific states as rail distribution networks crisscrossed 
the nation.
41
 Cranberry farmers acquired and improved naturally producing bogs 
throughout the last part of the 19
th
 century. Technically managed farms produced four 
times the volume of ripe berries per acre as their natural bog counterparts. Hall‘s 
research techniques provided techniques for modification and development of existing 
marshes. The 1920s witnessed the transition of Wisconsin bogs from traditional 
harvesting of wild berries to modern water harvesting techniques, which involves 
gathering floating berries off of a flooded bog. The development of several cooperatives 
and marketing firms through the 20
th
 century spurred industrial development in the area 
by attracting processors, storage facilities and transportation.
42
 
 Transplantation of cranberries to the west coast began in the early 1870s, but the 
initial bogs failed to produce. The first successful cultivated bog, modeled after similar 
bogs in Massachusetts, appeared in 1881 in the Long Beach, California, area. The two-
decade gap between development of Wisconsin and West Coast bogs occurred because 
V. Macrocarpon’s natural range does not extend to the west coast of the United States. 
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The region has many areas environmentally suitable for the species, if the land is 
properly prepared. Unfortunately, many insect and disease pests accompanied the 
original cuttings from the East Coast and Wisconsin. Without their natural predators and 
environments, many of them quickly became serious obstacles to successful production. 
Although the acreage and production totals of bogs in the Northwest have always 
remained a small percentage of the overall industry, Washington‘s absolute yield has 
grown steadily.
43
 
 All growing areas showed increasing productivity per acre from the turn of the 
twentieth century through the cranberry scare. Northeast growing regions always 
dominated production at more than 60% of total production, with Wisconsin and the 
Northwest region competing for second. Although Washington and Oregon bogs 
consistently showed a much higher productivity per acre than either of the other two 
growing regions, their vastly smaller available acreage left them third in production 
volume (See Figures 1 and 2).
44
 The high productivity rate in the Northwest, versus 
those in Wisconsin and Massachusetts, resulted from its cranberry farmers‘ use of bog 
design, technical improvements in planting and harvesting, as well as application of 
chemicals for control of plant and animal pests.
45
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Figure 2: Regional cranberry productivity, 1940-1965 
46
 
 
 In the mid-19
th
 century, development of publications, organizations, and research 
created the infrastructure for the cranberry industry. Early publications provided 
potential entrepreneurs with the basic skills and understanding necessary for cranberry 
cultivation. The two most prominent publications, Benjamin Eastwood‘s The Cranberry 
and Its Culture (1856) and Joseph J. White‘s Cranberry Culture (1870) provided advice 
on bog placement and preparation, nutrition and water management practices, and insect 
and plant pest management, as well as harvest and storage requirements. In addition to 
being cranberry growers and researchers, Eastwood was a reverend and White was a 
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machinist. Nineteenth and twentieth century versions of these instruction manuals 
included marketing and distribution advice.
47
 
 Cranberry organizations and cooperatives made the difficult and labor intensive 
process of managing cranberry bogs easier and more effective. Local, state and national 
grower organizations developed to serve the needs of the growing cranberry community 
as the industry moved toward larger scale production. Cranberry farmers founded the 
earliest recorded organization, the American Cranberry Grower‘s Association (ACGA), 
in New Jersey in 1871, followed by the Wisconsin State Cranberry Grower‘s 
Association (WSCGA) in 1887, and the Cape Cod Cranberry Grower‘s Association 
(CCCGA) in 1888. Each regional organization served as a central administrative body 
for marketing, disseminating technical information, publication of reports and 
newsletters, and social interaction, while many regional cooperatives provided financial 
services to members.
48
 
 Organizations and cooperatives formed, split and merged as the market and 
regional needs changed. The 1930 merger of the American Cranberry Exchange, one of 
the earliest cranberry cooperatives, with several other cooperative groups resulted in the 
formation of the National Cranberry Association (NCA).
49
 Good leadership and 
aggressive marketing brought many other cooperatives and processing facilities under 
the company‘s control over the next three decades. The cooperative reorganized in 
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August 1959, making the stock ownership by individual members proportional to their 
annual deliveries into the pool and changing the organization‘s name to Ocean Spray 
Cranberries, Inc. Although it occurred only two months before the scare, no evidence 
was found to indicate the change in leadership had any bearing on the industry‘s 
response to the scare. Ocean Spray was one of the primary organizations involved in the 
testing and litigation surrounding the cranberry scare, because it dominated cranberry 
sales and distribution with control of over 75% of the market in fresh and processed 
berries.
50
 
 Farmers and cooperatives sold the vast majority of the annual cranberry crop up 
to 1959 as either canned sauce or fresh fruit. One of the earliest cranberry products 
marketed nationally was ―Ruby Phosphate‖ jam in 1912.51 The percentage of the annual 
crop that was sold for processing increased from 17% in 1935 to 50% in 1955. This 
increase indicated a major shift in the way the cranberry industry dealt with the 
increasing amounts of available berries.
52
 Manufacturers made canned sauce by boiling 
the berries, removing the skins, then mixing the resulting juice slurry with sugar to 
reduce the tartness. The addition of flavors or thickeners produced the desired 
consistency and taste. Cooperative members processed both the fresh fruit and canned 
products, giving them a significant market advantage. Independent operation became 
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increasingly difficult as large cooperatives, such as Ocean Spray, dominated the market 
and set prices.
53
 
Early cranberry farmers typically shipped berries grown in New England bogs in 
small quantities by wagon or barge.
54
 Railroads commonly shipped berries to market 
after the 1850s, especially from Wisconsin bogs to East or West coast markets. The 
advent of the automobile and long distance trucking in the early twentieth century 
doomed a number of rail lines whose main purpose was seasonal cranberry transport.
55
 
 Research has been one of the cornerstones of the cranberry industry since Henry 
Hall in 1810. Cultivar development, water management techniques, harvest technology, 
pest management, and technological development and testing have been the main 
recurring themes in cranberry research. As the industry developed, marketing, 
distribution, and research needs grew beyond the abilities of amateur entrepreneurs like 
Hall. State and regional research stations developed in response to the growing needs of 
the cranberry community, reflecting larger growth trends in industry, science, 
population, and education.
56
  
 Research stations dedicated to cranberry production appeared in all of the major 
growing zones. The University of Massachusetts founded the Cranberry Experiment 
Station in 1910. The State College of Washington founded the Long Beach Cranberry 
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Research Station in 1923 to serve the West Coast cranberry community.
57
 The 
Wisconsin Cranberry Board, Inc., part of the Wisconsin State Cranberry Grower‘s 
Association, charged a small sum from its producing members to fund research and 
marketing projects. In addition to the specialty cranberry stations, state agricultural 
experiment stations in cranberry producing areas played key roles in developing 
technologies specific to their regional needs. University departments, such as the 
horticulture department of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, played major research 
and educational roles.
58
 
 In 1959, half a dozen major research facilities focused on cranberry production, 
in addition to projects by individuals and universities. The cranberry research facilities in 
each growing region played important roles in development of technology and best 
practices for the cranberry industry. Periodic publications and newsletters, such as 
Cranberry Magazine and Ocean Spray‘s newsletter The Scoop, helped keep both the 
consumer and the industry informed about new developments and technologies for 
harvesting and distribution. 
These institutions greatly advanced the understanding of cranberries and 
technologies useful in their cultivation.
59
 A good example of the technological 
innovations by the research stations involved the use of large volumes of water in the 
bogs. D. J. Crowley, farmer, cranberry researcher and director of the Long Beach 
Cranberry Research Station from 1923 through the 1950s, pioneered the use of artificial 
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sprinkler systems to prevent frost damage in 1925, theorizing that berries covered in 
frozen water would survive a frost that would wilt exposed berries. Frozen water 
released latent heat as it changed from liquid to solid, preventing the cranberries from 
going below freezing during a frost. His research and understanding of the nature of the 
berries as well as heat-generating reactions changed the nature of the industry. The 
sprinklers allowed farmers to continue to apply water to the bog as long as the frost 
lasted. Sprinkler-enhanced bogs have been standard since the 1930s, providing easier 
and more even watering than is possible with natural flood systems.
60
 
An offshoot of sprinkler systems was wet harvesting. In the 1920s, some bog 
owners speculated that they could use the same procedures for post-harvest flooding to 
float off debris and uncollected berries as well as for the primary harvest. A fortunate 
natural adaptation for distributing seeds made modern water harvesting feasible. A 
mature cranberry has several air pockets inside the fruit, called locules, which allow it to 
float. Many bogs were ―water raked,‖ which involved a shallow flood and the use of 
hand rakes to gather floating berries missed during traditional harvesting. Wisconsin 
cranberry producers developed the full wet harvest in the 1930s as a result of both 
available water and advances in harvesting technologies. Vastly more efficient and 
productive than traditional harvesting methods, wet harvesting quickly dominated the 
market and was the harvesting method of 80% of the growers in 1959.
61
 
 
60 Pacific Coast Cranberry Research Foundation., Pacific Coast Cranberries: The Cranberry Industry and Its History 
in Pacific County, 33-37. 
61 Eck, The American Cranberry, 43-55. 
  
27 
The movement of the cranberry industry toward scientific and systematic 
agricultural research accelerated the incorporation of the cranberry industry into the 
broader agricultural market. Smaller bogs were often unable to incorporate the  
newest technologies requiring expensive equipment or increased manpower, making 
them less competitive. Application of field research to ever-larger commercial bogs also 
began a trend toward increasing productivity per acre and the inclusion and upgrading of 
marginal or under-producing bogs that previously were too difficult to manage.
62
 
From 1890 through the mid-twentieth century, the cranberry remained an 
economically marginal agricultural product with limited public appeal. Cranberries were 
consumed almost entirely during the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, making the 
cranberry market extremely seasonal. Although critically important to the economies of 
cranberry growing regions, the cranberry industry contributed less than one tenth of 1% 
to overall national agricultural totals in crop value and volume.
63
 
 
Technology in cranberry production, 1930-1959 
 Technology was the central element in all aspects of bog management and 
cranberry production. Individual bogs were the focus of intense agricultural efforts 
throughout the year, including management of the water systems, weed, disease and pest 
prevention, fertilization, semi-annual sanding, and harvest. Post harvest activities, such 
as trimming, weeding, and flooding off debris, often required as much time and effort as 
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harvest itself. The goal of maximum productivity required the farmer‘s constant effort. 
Effective application of the most current planting and management methods was critical 
to remaining competitive in the cranberry market.
64
 
 Bog engineering developed as a direct result of research and better understanding 
of the needs of the cranberry and its specialized environment. Sanding, grading, and 
water flow design began as simple procedures to adjust natural bogs and help the plants 
produce. Bog engineering combined traditional practices with modern university and 
experiment station research to maximize production. Experienced bog managers in 
addition to experienced farmers were increasingly necessary for the proper upkeep of 
existing bogs, as well as the planning, placement, and construction of new bogs.
65
 
 The hydrology of a cranberry bog was the most critical technological hurdle in 
bog development. Cranberry crops had twice the water requirements of other temperate 
crops, requiring 6 acre feet or nearly two million gallons per acre annually (one acre foot 
of water = 325,851 gallons = 43,560 cubic feet). Each acre of bog was typically 
associated with two to four acres of support land, often taking the form of natural 
reservoir wetlands. This symbiotic relationship supported proper management of the 
wetlands by allowing the water to flow through periodically while providing the critical 
water resource for the cranberries. In addition to regular watering, bogs required at least 
one annual flooding in the spring for insect control and one flooding in winter to protect 
the vines from frost. Water harvesting in the fall required yet another flooding. Without 
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access to inexpensive sources of renewable water, cranberry production was not 
economically feasible.
66
  
 Around 1900, mechanical devices, including a ―vine setter‖ which simply forced 
cuttings into the soft soil with a series of discs, replaced the time-consuming task of 
hand planting cranberry vines.
67
 Farmers often built such devices by hand. Cuttings of a 
few specific varieties were used for commercial cranberry propagation; they were often 
gleaned from the annual cuttings of mature bogs. The plants grew well from seed, but 
the resulting vines took longer to develop and begin producing. Cranberries were self-
pollinators, making efforts to increase yield through the introduction of pollinators 
unnecessary. The use of honeybees was common nonetheless because insect pollination 
and agitation increased productivity. A well planted and developed bog needed two and 
four years to begin producing marketable quantities of berries.
68
 
 The technology of picking cranberries developed quickly as bogs increased in 
number and size. Early bogs were managed with simple hand-picking and raking. Both 
labor-intensive and time-consuming, hand-picking results in relatively low productivity 
in yield per worker hour but very high quality. Hand-picked berries were pre-sorted in 
the field for quality and ripeness, with unripe berries left for later harvesting, requiring 
multiple passes during the harvest season. The hand scoop or rake, invented around 
1900, eventually replaced hand picking and enabled the development of the first large 
commercial bogs. Although scooping initially decreased productivity resulting from vine 
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damage and missed berries, it reduced the number of workers required to harvest a given 
acreage. Eventually scoops and other mechanical devices matched or exceeded the 
productivity of experienced hand picking. Scooping technology and its limitations 
inspired further development into machine driven pickers.
69
  
Each successful innovation increased productivity from existing bogs and shaped 
the development of new bogs to capitalize on the new possibilities. A 1929 Wisconsin 
Department of Agriculture report stated that the industry was in a rapid transitional 
phase between the old and the new technologies.
70
 A wide variety of experimental 
mechanical pickers and devices, such as the snap scoop (1928), electric weed whackers 
(1940s), and the Darlington picker (1950) were developed by cranberry experiment 
stations and innovative farmers. Inventors were always seeking the best combination of 
maximized collection, reduced fruit and vine damage, and mechanical efficiency.
71
 
 The processing of cranberries immediately after harvest has not changed 
significantly since the development of early commercial bogs. Cleaning and sorting of a 
cranberry harvest was critical to maintain consistent quality and color. Workers washed, 
dried, and sorted the berries before placing selected berries into storage containers.
72
 The 
early observation that ripe and sound berries bounced, whereas diseased or damaged 
berries were soft and generally broke, set the standard for cranberry inspection and 
 
69 C. A. Doehlert and New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station, Cranberry Picking Methods and Costs Per Barrel, 
Cranberry Picking (1950), 1-4. 
70 Bain and Control., Cranberry Industry in Wisconsin, 5. 
71 Thomas, Cranberry Harvest: A History of Cranberry Growing in Massachusetts, 107-17. 
72 United States. Dept. of Agriculture and H. F. Bain, Harvesting and Handling Cultivated Cranberries, Farmers' 
Bulletin, 15-24. 
  
31 
sorting. Mechanical sorters in 1959, based on the original concept first automated in 
1880, employed agitated conveyor belt systems to detect the non-bouncing berries.
73
 
 Storage and shipping of cranberries also changed over the decades. Cranberries 
deteriorated rapidly on the vine and in unprotected environments. However, they kept 
well packed in cold water and almost indefinitely if refrigerated or frozen. Freezing had 
little effect on the berries, which defrosted with minimal bruising or damage. Freezing 
and refrigeration of berries were increasingly common transportation and distribution 
technologies after 1900. In the 1940s, the cranberry industry began experiencing 
problems with large volumes of fruit being produced that were still available when the 
next crop was harvested. Fruit that was not sold or immediately processed was frozen for 
later distribution or processing.
74
 
The ability to preserve large volumes of berries not sold in their harvest year 
certainly exacerbated the carryover problem as production increased, but carryover and 
production were intricately related in cranberry growing. The simplest solution was to 
curtail some production, but cutting production meant loss of revenue for farmers. At the 
same time, farmers knew that stopping production destroyed the bog. Unpicked berries 
tend to rot on the vine, attracting unwanted insects and pests. The carryover problem was 
not a simple matter of production quotas or overproduction. The combination of 
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economic incentive and uncooperative berries created a situation for farmers that could 
only be solved through changes in distribution, marketing and use patterns.
75
 
Finding prompt shipping for their product was always a critical concern for 
cranberry growers. Transportation and distribution of cranberries followed the 
development of transportation in the United States. As new technologies opened new 
regions and changed distribution patterns, cranberries entered new markets in increasing 
volumes. Shipping by rail in refrigerated cars distributed cranberries quickly across the 
United States, maintaining freshness and opening new markets for cranberries. The 
advent of trucking then provided the ability to distribute smaller amounts of fresh berries 
to almost any location.
76
   
 Difficult economic times, such as the depression of the 1930s, hurt the cranberry 
industry, but they tended to have a secondary positive effect on productivity by inspiring 
change and development. War also stimulated cranberry production because canned and 
dried cranberry products had been popular comfort foods to ship to American soldiers 
since World War I. Both of these factors combined during the scare. Surpluses were 
creating difficult economic situations for many cranberry farmers, and the loss of 
military sales hit the industry hard when the government recalled and restricted the 
distribution of cranberry products to servicemen in 1959, amounting to approximately 
10% of the total annual consumption.
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The cultivation of cranberries was a perfect example of the integration of 
traditional practice and technology over time. A long history of innovation and 
experimentation in horticulture and technology characterized the cranberry industry. The 
systematic combination of cranberry culture and technology created a vibrant and 
productive industry, using lands not suitable for other agriculture. The cranberry industry 
in 1959 maintained this character and continued the general upward trends of its past. 
Although the geography of cranberry production remained limited to the areas naturally 
able to sustain the plant, technology and research improved productivity far beyond 
natural levels.
78
 
According to the USDA, the annual cranberry crop from 1950 through 1959 
averaged just over one million 100-pound barrels. The 1950 cranberry season began with 
a carryover from 1949 of 320,000 barrels (30%), followed by an average carryover of 
176, 505 barrels through 1956. Large volumes of berries potentially contaminated with 
aminotriazole were withheld in 1957, 1958, and 1959, which skewed the carryover 
numbers, but the same growth trends applied. The 1959 season was expected to be the 
largest on record at an estimated 1,273,000 barrels, with an estimated 400,000 barrels 
(33%) carried over from 1958.
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Table 3: Crop carryover statistics, 1948-1962 (in 100 lb. barrels) 
Growing period Industry carryover Total production Avg. percentage 
carryover 
1948-1950 (avg.) 267,333 866,100 31% 
1951-1953 (avg.) 67,037 972,366 7% 
1954-1956 (avg.) 272,425 1,006,333 26% 
1957 150,000 (estimate) 1,050,000 14% 
1958 300,000 (estimate) 1,165,600 26% 
1959 225,000 (estimate) 1,251,700 18% 
1960-1962 (avg.) 200,000 1,300,533 15% 
80
 
 
Based on the raw numbers, the cranberry industry was phenomenally productive 
and outwardly successful. However, the forced annual carryover resulting from the 
combination of stagnant demand, increasing production, developing picking and storage 
technologies, and improved transportation was slowly dragging the industry down (See 
Table 3). Although the average consumption level kept pace with general population 
growth, supply was greatly outpacing the highly seasonal demand. In optimum 
conditions the American cranberry was extremely prolific, and it overwhelmed the 
ability of the industry to fully dispose of its own product.
81
 Although the price per barrel 
rose from $5.76 per barrel in 1949 to $11.60 in 1958 and the crop was still potentially 
lucrative, the difficulty of disposing of the product was making cranberry growing risky. 
Annual carryovers forced the industry to maintain warehouses of frozen or refrigerated 
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berries from the previous year while harvesting a new year‘s crop, wasting capital and 
berries to spoilage. The situation in the fall of 1959 was already looking dire, requiring 
extraordinary efforts or extraordinary events to save the industry from collapse.
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CHAPTER III 
UNITED STATES FOOD LEGISLATION AND THE SCIENCE 
OF CHEMICAL TESTING 
The history of food legislation and growing concerns over adulterants and 
carcinogens in food laid the groundwork for the cranberry scare. This chapter explores 
the development of American food law and the growth of the science of chemical 
testing, both of which played critical roles in the development and immediate 
circumstances of the scare.  
For most of history, the primary concern in society was simply acquiring enough 
nutrition and calories to survive and compete. Pre-industrial societies tended to revolve 
around the acquisition and distribution of food to their members. As western society 
developed and modernized, the search for food moved from a subsistence activity to a 
specialized occupation. Farmers and the many people who provided foods, both 
processed and raw, became iconic members of society that often marginalized them as 
quaint and rural yet ultimately indispensable.
83
 
Modern American society has generally moved beyond the perception of food as 
a basic biological need, preferring to eat for enjoyment as well as survival. Events such 
as food scares that interrupt that desire for abundant, healthy foods have generated 
strong reactions in both industry and the public.
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The nature and quality of food have remained an important element of our 
perception of food despite the movement away from consumption of only fresh foods. 
Records from as early as the third century B.C. showed concerns over artificial additives 
and food fraud. Modern American society has developed an almost obsessive concern 
with the purity and quality of its food, and the cranberry scare reflected that concern.
85
 
Foods themselves, whether raw or prepared, have often developed into socially 
constructed elements of a society, and became important elements of cultural identity. 
Cranberries were just such an American food icon, closely associated with holiday 
feasting. Thanksgiving and Christmas became the primary periods for the consumption 
of cranberries.
86
 
The pivotal organizations involved in monitoring the quality of cranberries in 
1959 were the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and the cranberry industry itself. The cranberry industry worked in close 
association with state and federal organizations. Most bogs were in naturally occurring 
wetland regions, and cranberry growers were had to carefully heed state and federal laws 
governing wetlands, wildlife, and water protection. Twentieth-century movements to 
protect wetlands, wildlife and water quality have seriously curtailed the use of natural 
bog lands for cranberry production.
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The cranberry scare was a consequence of elements of the Federal Food, Drugs 
and Cosmetics Act of 1938 and its amendments. The scare was the first major test of the 
1958 Delaney Clause and the FDA‘s interpretation of the statute. The scare was also the 
first time the FDA used the Delaney clause to publicly ban a potentially harmful 
chemical because of residues in food.
88
 
 
Early food concerns and legislation 
The history of food legislation in the United States can began in colonial times, 
with deep roots in British common law. A long series of acts and developments 
demonstrated consistent concern and progress toward the assurance of a clean and safe 
food supply. Government has always played a central role in protecting the food supply 
through legislation and the courts.
89
 
 The US food industry, guided by state and federal laws, has a long history of 
testing, questioning the safety of new production methodologies, and regulatory 
concerns. Concern over food quality and purity had a strong presence in American law 
from colonial days. A series of state legislation and programs marked the progression 
toward a national policy on food and its regulation. Massachusetts passed the first 
significant law in the United States prohibiting adulteration of food in Massachusetts in 
1785. ―An Act Against Selling Unwholesome Provisions‖ prohibited the selling of 
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contaminated, diseased, or otherwise unwholesome food. It included punishments in the 
form of fines, imprisonment, and public humiliation.
90
 
By 1900, almost every state had enacted laws similar to the Massachusetts 
statute, including meat, dairy and general food protections. The California Pure Food 
Act of 1850, the direct result of rapid population growth during the gold rush, and the 
Indiana Pure Food and Drug Law of 1899 are good examples of pre-1906 laws. Such 
laws sought to curtail misbranding of products and to regulate the manufacture of 
packaged goods sold within the state and goods transported into the state.
91
 
Most state legislation did a good job of protecting inhabitants from threats within 
the state. They commonly regulated raw agricultural products such as milk and eggs, 
which were particularly prone to contamination and adulteration. The primary 
shortcoming with local legislation was in dealing with products imported from other 
states, outside of their jurisdiction. Manufacturers also found it difficult to meet all of the 
varying state requirements.
92
 
An almost endless parade of claims and counterclaims for new products and 
chemicals occurred throughout American history. Books and articles condemning or 
supporting them followed new product innovations and potentially harmful chemical 
additions. Frederick Accum‘s 1820 work, A Treatise on Adulterations of Food and 
Culinary Poisons, not only exposed a list of ―fraudulent sophistications,‖ but also 
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provided readers with means to detect them.
93
 The 1820 publication of the United States 
Pharmacopea by a convention of medical professionals from around the United States 
provided doctors and lawmakers with reliable systems of standards, quality control, and 
formulation for a variety of drugs. Existence of the Pharmacopea revolutionized 
standardization of drugs and food additives in the United States and paved the way for 
broader federal legislation.
94
 
Early federal legislative efforts focused on specific products that needed 
protections because of their higher economic value or potentially harmful character. The 
1848 Drug Importation Act sought to stop the importation of adulterated drugs, 
especially formulations that conflicted with the US Pharmacopea. The 1897 Tea 
Importation Act regulated the quality of imported teas and placed inspection at the 
expense of the importer. The 1897 Bottled in Bond Act required a minimum of four 
years of federally inspected warehousing before bottling and shipping whiskey to 
retailers. Although it did not guarantee high quality, it did ensure that the product was 
actually distilled whiskey.
95
 
 
Progress toward the 1906 Food and Drug Act 
By 1906 the American public had learned to be suspicious of processed foods 
and wary of mislabeled foods and medicines. Lethal chemicals and medicines, such as 
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intentionally adulterated ―snake oils‖ and unintentionally contaminated medicines, as 
well as consistent problems with the quality of packed and processed foods, indicated 
the need for serious action. Processing and manufacturing industries continuously sought 
ways to make cheaper products in greater volume while increasing profits. As a result, 
more and more chemicals entered the food supply.
96
 
Several legislative and industrial leaders paved the way for development of a 
comprehensive federal law designed to protect the consumer from adulterated foods. Dr. 
Edward Robinson Squibb (1819-1900), a leading pharmaceutical manufacturer, inventor 
and physician, proposed a national food and drug law in 1879. Squibb‘s bill and a 
similar attempt in 1892 by Populist political groups failed to gather enough interest in 
Congress or to arouse the public consciousness.
97
 
The most important figure in shaping modern food law was Dr. Harvey W. Wiley 
(1844-1930), the father of American food and drug law. In addition to being a medical 
doctor, he was and experienced researcher, a professor of chemistry at Purdue 
University, and the state chemist for Indiana. Wiley became the Chief Chemist of the US 
Department of Agriculture in 1883, a position he held through 1912, and was the main 
proponent of the development of comprehensive food legislation. Wiley‘s efforts in the 
science of testing for chemical effects paved the way for legislators and analysts alike. 
He pioneered adulteration studies in a wide range of areas, including human testing and 
named his controversial group of young male volunteers, who consumed various 
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amounts of test substances to determine their effects on human systems, ―the poison 
squad‖.98 He produced two editions of Foods and their Adulteration (1907 and 1912), to 
update the public on new ―sophistications‖ that they should avoid in their food.99 
Proponents of the 1906 Food and Drug Act called it the Wiley Act in honor of Wiley‘s 
contributions. 
Opposition to the proposed 1906 Food and Drug Act took several forms. 
Industrial and corporate resistance, including resistance from patent medicine advertisers 
and food manufacturers, was the strongest. Manufacturers claimed they could not do 
their jobs without preservatives, needing chemicals to produce a profitable product. 
Patent medicine advertisers knew they would lose much of their business if the law 
placed limitations upon the contents of their wares. Southern legislators also resisted the 
efforts to pass the bill, citing state‘s rights concerns.100 
Wiley and the 1906 Act received help from a variety of groups, including 
women‘s groups, advertisers, and business organizations. The science and medical fields 
strongly supported increased restrictions and guidelines to protect the public.
101
 The 
deplorable conditions publicized by Upton Sinclair in The Jungle (1906) were also great 
inspiration, if not one of the strongest factors in the bill‘s passage. Sinclair‘s 
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fictionalized narrative dramatized so many public safety and health concerns that 
Congress had no choice but to respond to the public outrage.
102
 President Roosevelt 
received an advance copy of the work and was disturbed enough to send his own 
investigators to Chicago to confirm Sinclair‘s story. Roosevelt coined the term 
―muckrakers‖ in referring to such crusading reformers.103 The works of other prominent 
muckrakers, such as journalist, philosopher and author Lincoln Steffens, also had strong 
impacts on political and social attitudes. In the end, the interests of the consumer were 
considered paramount in Congress and an almost unanimous Congressional vote 
vindicated Wiley‘s efforts.104 
The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was signed into law by President 
Theodore Roosevelt on June 30, 1906, with the goals of ―preventing the manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, 
drugs, medicines, and liquors, and for regulating traffic therein, and for other purposes.‖ 
The simultaneous passage of the 1906 Meat Inspection Act was also a product of the 
work of men and women like Wiley and the muckrakers.
105
 
The 1906 hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
used cranberries as an example of why statutory restriction of chemicals and 
preservatives in food was meaningless without limits and levels. Benzoic acid, often 
used as a chemical preservative, degrades to poisonous hippuric acid in the body, which 
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is excreted by the liver and acts as an antibacterial in the urine. Cranberries are one of 
the most abundant naturally occurring sources of benzoic acid, with levels often 
exceeding that of the most tainted processed foods.
106
 Wiley contended that substances 
creating poisons in the body‘s processes were useful as means of stimulating action of 
the liver and kidneys to excrete them. However, he proposed that industrial use of much 
larger quantities of benzoic acid, or other similar preservatives, would overwhelm the 
body‘s ability to deal with the poison effectively, causing cancers and other health 
problems.
107
 
 The 1906 Food and Drugs Act restricted interstate transport and manufacturing 
of adulterated and misbranded goods. The Bureau of Chemistry had responsibility to 
assess products. The Department of Agriculture then decided whether the offense 
justified legal action. That police responsibility shifted to the Food, Drug, and 
Insecticide Administration after its formal creation in 1927. The organization was 
formally renamed the Food and Drug Administration in 1930.
108
 The bill also legislated 
proper labeling of products, and it mandated prescriptions for certain drugs considered 
too hazardous for unrestricted public use. The 1906 act also permanently incorporated 
the US Pharmacopea as the basis for its definition and regulation of pharmaceutical 
compounds.
109
 
 The 1906 act was a relatively simple law for an increasingly complex problem. It 
was weak in regulatory and punishment capabilities and tended to force government 
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entities to react to problems after they had been reported, rather than allowing preventive 
action. It placed the burden of proof that a product was intentionally fraudulent on the 
government. The 1906 act did not include provisions for food standards, without which 
the FDA could not legally prove misbranding of a suspected product. Although food 
standards and regulatory structures were part of Wiley‘s original concept, they did not 
make it into the final version as a result of legislative bargaining with industries, 
undermining the authority of the statute. The difficulty in effectively protecting the 
public and the continued growth of chemical additives in food required a much more 
robust law.
110
  
Wiley and supporters of food law reform considered revision of the 1906 statute 
essential almost from the moment of its passing. Resistance to revising the law, as well 
as continued support, came from the same quarters as in 1906. Industry resisted most 
efforts to change the law fearing increased regulation would damage their business. 
Public lobbying groups rallied around changes to better protect the public from 
avoidable harm.
111
 
Despite the general resistance of industry to the law based on fear of losing 
business, many manufacturers made productive use of its specifics and found new 
sources of success. Promotional themes advertising compliance with the law, such as the 
Royal Baking Powder Company‘s aggressive promotion of its cream of tartar baking 
powder which contained no alum or soda fillers, boosted sales and forced competitors to 
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upgrade their operations or perish. Industry leaders, such as Pittsburgh vegetable packer 
H. J. Heinz and Milwaukee brewer Frederick Pabst, who could advertise that they were 
in compliance with a law designed to protect the public‘s welfare, had a positive 
competitive edge.
112
 
The 1929 publication of Wiley‘s experience with the 1906 law was another 
element in generating further interest for revision. Setting his narrative in the form of a 
criminal case, Wiley presented numerous examples of indifference and ignorance toward 
the health of the nation by industry and government. He cited a long list of compromises 
that undermined the purpose of the 1906 law, as well as internal disagreements over the 
central principles of the legislation.
113
 
 Bills designed to replace the 1906 statute were proposed and rejected throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s. Between 1912 and 1930, the Food and Drugs Act was amended 
five times to improve or add definitions to the original text. The 1912 Sherley 
Amendment, named after Representative Joseph Swagar Sherley (D-KY) for his efforts 
in getting it passed, was proposed in response to a Supreme Court ruling that left the 
responsibility for proof of intentional mislabeling with government. It included drugs 
labeled with fraudulent therapeutic claims among the prohibited misbranded items. The 
1913 Gould Amendment, sponsored by Representative Samuel W. Gould (D-ME), also 
known as the ―net-weight‖ amendment, required that weight, unit of measure, or 
numerical count be plainly marked on the outside of packages. The 1930 McNary-Mapes 
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amendment, called the ―Canner‘s Bill,‖ authorized FDA standards for quality and ―fill-
of-container‖ for canned foods. Two other amendments further defined prescription 
drugs (1914) and formally created the independent Food, Drug, and Insecticide 
Administration (1927).
114
 
 Successive amendments and failed attempts to prevent dangerous chemicals from 
entering the food supply made it clear to Congress there was a need for preventive 
legislation. The government needed to shift responsibility to the industries and to impose 
regulations before products ever reached the public. Well-funded industries had an 
advantage because the FDA lacked the time, manpower and funding to litigate every 
case. It took 32 more years of experimentation and litigation before the issue reached a 
new turning point. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938, also referred to 
as the Tugwell Bill after its chief proponent, Rexford Tugwell, was designed to be just 
such a preventive measure. Tugwell had been the Undersecretary of Agriculture under 
Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1934 to 1937 and was one of the major architects of FDR‘s 
New Deal.
115
 
 On top of congressional pressure and industry maneuvering, one pivotal event 
enabled the passage of the 1938 bill. Investigators linked more than 100 fatalities in 
September and October of 1937, mostly children in southern states, to the patent 
medicine Elixir of Sulfanilamide. The drug contained a potentially lethal dose of the 
poisonous solvent diethylene glycol, which dissolved solid sulfanilamide to give a liquid 
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solution. Investigation showed that no testing had been done on the product and that 
even a cursory study would have revealed the lethal nature of the solvent. The tragedy 
helped the 1938 bill by demonstrating exactly what was wrong with the existing law and 
providing the focal point for change. Fears of similar events shaped the public‘s concern 
during the cranberry scare.
116
  
 The 1938 Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, signed into law by President 
Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, greatly expanded the power of the FDA and federal 
government. The new law extended FDA control to cosmetics and therapeutic devices, 
authorized factory inspections by FDA officials, and set safe tolerances for unavoidable 
poisonous substances. Manufacturers now had to prove their products were safe before 
distribution to the public. The FDA also received the right to place legal injunctions 
against offenders, in addition to its existing powers of seizure and prosecution.
117
 
Wiley and food law reform supporters proposed amendments to the new food 
law almost immediately. The 1940s through 1950s was a period of rapid social and 
industrial development as demonstrated by the technologies and chemicals that required 
new language and protections. The 1941 and 1945 Insulin and Penicillin amendments 
required the FDA to test and assure the purity and effectiveness of the drugs before 
public distribution. Concerns such as radiation began to find their way into the 
regulations in 1954, when the FDA began inspecting Pacific tuna suspected of 
irradiation by nuclear testing. The 1954 Miller Pesticides Amendment created 
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procedures for setting limits on pesticide residues on raw agricultural products, but it did 
not contain any language concerning carcinogens. The 1954 amendment was the first of 
three amendments resulting from the Delaney hearings in 1950-1956 and set the stage 
for further developments (See Table 4).
118
 
 
Table 4: Amendments to 1938 Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1938-1960 
Amendment Date enacted 
Miller Amendment June 24, 1948 
Durham-Humphrey Amendment October 26, 1951 
Factory Inspection Amendment August 7, 1953 
Miller Pesticides Amendment July 22, 1954 
Food Additives Amendment (Delaney) September 6, 1958 
Pesticide Chemicals Amendment June 29, 1960 
Color Additives Amendment July 12, 1960 
119
 
 
The 1958 Food Additives Amendment and the Delaney clause 
The amendment that ultimately enabled the cranberry scare was House 
Resolution 13254, which became the 1958 Food Additives Amendment. It required 
manufacturers to establish the safety of their products if they contained new food 
additives. The 1958 amendment also formalized and added to a list of additives 
considered safe in their intended uses based on the judgment of scientific experts and a 
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long history of problem-free use. GRAS (Generally Recognized as Safe) substances 
were exempt from the approval and testing process required for other additives.
120
 
The amendment‘s Delaney clause stated that ―no additive shall be deemed to be 
safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after 
tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce 
cancer in man or animal‖.121 An attempt to regulate extremely complex social, scientific 
and political concerns, the clause became one of the most controversial clauses in food 
regulation history. Its passage resulted from many years of congressional investigation, 
communication with scientific experts, and negotiation between lawmakers and industry 
interests.
122
 
The House Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Foods and 
Cosmetics, formed in 1950 and headed by James Delaney, drafted the initial wording. 
The committee did the initial research into the current state of knowledge on chemicals 
and chemical adulteration. From the beginning of the amendment‘s development, 
Congressional intent was to bring the current food and drug legislation in tune with 
modern food science and technology. The Food Additive Amendment of 1958 was the 
culmination of ―extensive and intensive hearings‖ involving testimony from nationally 
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renowned scientists and medical professionals about common adulterants in food and 
their potential effects.
123
 
The stated purpose of the hearings begun in 1950 was to determine the nature, 
extent, and effect of chemicals, compounds, pesticides, insecticides, and synthetics, as 
well as any combination of the substances, on the food supply and consumers. The 
investigation included chemicals introduced as a result of processing and packaging. It 
also looked at the effects of chemicals on the environment and on animal‘s exposure to 
residues.
124
 Although the initial hearings did not find major unaddressed issues in the 
current law, the FDA used the hearings to promote an amendment to provide more 
freedom to apply scientific judgment to its regulatory activities. Although the FDA was 
interested in an amendment concerning additives and residues to better protect the 
public, Congressional and industry resistance to more restrictive legislation prevented 
passage at that time.
125
 
The Subcommittee on Health and Science of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce held new hearings on chemicals in food from 1954 through 
1956. By 1954, Delaney was convinced of the need to protect the public against 
potential carcinogens in food. After the second series of hearings ending in 1956, 
Delaney passed the committee‘s recommendation to Congress that it amend the 1938 
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Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act to provide safeguards against foods adulterated by 
chemicals. The House submitted seven competing bills, one drafted by the FDA.
126
 
In August 1958, H.R.13254 passed the Senate without specifically mentioning 
carcinogens. A statement for the President by Secretary Arthur Flemming on the 
Department of Health Education and Welfare‘s (HEW) opinion of H.R.13254 does not 
mention carcinogens. Based on his statement that the proposed legislation ―leaves 
scientific questions to the scientist,‖ Flemming did not expect to include an anti-cancer 
clause in the final bill.
 127
 The text that eventually became the heart of the Delaney 
clause was actually proposed by the HEW in 1958 in response to Delaney‘s insistence to 
include a cancer provision. The HEW text was much less restrictive than Delaney‘s 
original proposition; it limited prohibition of carcinogens to those ingested orally.
128
 
The clause was originally left out of H.R. 13254 because it prevented the FDA 
from balancing the risks of a chemical versus its benefits. The Delaney clause was a 
barrier that deprived the public of the informed expertise of the FDA and its regulatory 
apparatus. The clause represented the substitution of an inflexible legislative standard for 
scientific discretion, as well as an impassible barrier to future scientific and 
technological developments because they might involve the use or study of banned 
substances. By preventing the incorporation of new discoveries and technologies that 
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might improve our understanding of potential carcinogens, its inflexibility became a 
detriment to the public rather than a benefit.
129
 
The Food Additives Amendment had a twofold purpose. First, it guarded public 
health by requiring the testing of new and unproven food additives by their 
manufacturers before their use. Second, it promoted innovation in food technology by 
permitting the use of previously banned additives if they could be scientifically shown to 
have safe levels of exposure. The intent of the 1958 Food Additives bill was to prevent 
the inclusion of any illness-causing substance, and it did that without the Delaney clause. 
Many scientists, especially chemical and medical specialists, opposed the clause because 
of its scientifically inflexible nature.
130
 The clause was eventually re-inserted as a result 
of Delaney‘s tenacity and personal influence in Congress and the willingness of HEW 
and FDA to compromise to make sure the larger amendment passed. In testimony before 
the House Subcommittee on Health and Science in 1958 Delaney stated, 
―Without going into details, I found it possible to prevent the legislation 
[H.R.13254] from reaching the floor of the House, and early in August 
representatives of the Food and Drug Administration met with me to find 
some way out of the impasse. In conference, we were able to work out and 
amendment covering carcinogens…Upon adoption of the amendment, I 
withdrew my opposition to the bill.‖ The final bill passed the House with the 
Delaney clause inserted, and it was signed into law in September 1958.
131
 
 
Cancer and public health were the two major issues at the center of the Delaney 
clause. What caused cancer and whether the cancer arose from exposure to particular 
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chemicals were hotly debated topics in both the scientific and legislative communities. 
Smoking was first linked clearly to lung cancer and heart disease in the 1930s as the first 
generations of heavy cigarette smokers developed the disease. However, the mechanism 
causing the cancer in smokers remained unclear.
132
 Clear evidence of the link between 
cigarette smoking and lung cancer, based on the findings of a joint study of the 
American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the National Cancer 
Institute, and the National Heart Institute was reported in Science in 1957.
133
 The 
Surgeon General of the United States first officially warned the American public about 
the dangers of smoking in 1964. Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee 
to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service summarized national and 
international research into smoking and its relationship to cancer from the previous sixty 
years. The conclusion was that a clear relationship existed between smoking and several 
cancers of the lung and respiratory system.
134
 
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce identified cancer as 
the most deadly and misunderstood of the potential health hazards facing the American 
people.
135
 The Delaney clause sought to protect the public from the unknowns of cancer 
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by banning any substance in food that testing could show to cause cancer. Congress 
chose to err on the side of overprotection to protect public safety.
136
 
Just before the second round of Delaney hearings in 1954, hearings before the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce looked at cancer, one of the 
―principal diseases of mankind‖. The second leading cause of death in the United States, 
medical researchers described cancer as an ―extraordinarily complex disease… with no 
known definitive cause.‖ William Donovan, director of the board of the American 
Cancer Society, stated that ―Cancer is still an all-pervading biological problem of 
baffling complexity,‖ but also noted that the ―centuries old scourge of cancer‖ appeared 
to be slowly yielding to scientific research. Each speaker before the committee 
characterized the fight against cancer as a war, requiring consistent funding, special 
weapons, and significant sacrifice in funds and manpower.
137
 
Although the testimony showed that medical professionals still did not know 
what caused cancer, there were explanations for the apparent rise in cancer deaths since 
the turn of the century. More and more people were living past 45, the statistical age at 
which cancer incidence rose exponentially. The rising number of older Americans 
required a rising number of doctors to care for them, and as the number of doctors 
increased, the number of cancer diagnoses went up. Increasingly accurate diagnostic 
techniques were finding cancers more frequently when they would have gone unnoticed 
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in the past. Lastly, a real increase in the rate of cancer because of chemical exposures, 
unhealthy eating habits, smoking, and sedentary lifestyles was possible.
138
 
In 1953, genes, hormones, viruses, radiation, and chemical exposure were the 
primary suspected causes of cancer. None of the many types of cancer were definitively 
linked to specific causes nor were they curable without early detection and treatment. 
Surgery was still the primary form of treatment, with radiation and chemotherapy as 
experimental alternatives that often had only temporary results.
 139
 No known serums, 
salves, or chemicals were effective against cancer, and individuals could do nothing to 
protect themselves with certainty. Grim cancer treatment statistics underscored how little 
scientists could do to battle the disease.
140
 
Intense efforts at public and professional education concerning cancer, begun in 
the early 1940s by the American Medical Association and the National Cancer Institute, 
were still under way in 1959. Programs distributed books, articles, movies, and 
brochures with the facts about cancer and its prevention. National magazines informed 
millions of readers of the early warning signs as well as available medical procedures. 
The central advice throughout the information campaigns was to minimize the delay 
between detection and treatment.
141
 
The medical and scientific communities had no certain cure, but their attempts to  
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explain the situation only confused the public. Doctors acknowledged that anxiety and 
fear were probable results of confusing and potentially unpleasant information. Doctors 
did not portray the situation as hopeless, but advising patience and trusting in future 
developments were of no consolation to those who might suffer in the present. Education 
programs and publication of accurate diagnostic information were good for the general 
health of the population because of increased awareness of symptoms and treatment 
options. Unfortunately, the lack of effective treatment options only underscored the 
severity of the problem in the public consciousness. Thus, a potentially cancer-causing 
chemical found in food elicited a strong response, whether the evidence for 
carcinogenicity was valid or not.
142
  
National Cancer Institute testimony during the 1953 hearings provided sobering 
mortality statistics and posited a very challenging road ahead for cancer research. It 
suggested the two main reasons for not seeking treatment were ignorance of the signs of 
cancer and fear. The fear encompassed basic fear of the unknown, fear of the physically 
traumatic treatments, fear of death, and even generalized fear of the social disgrace in 
having cancer. All of these forms of fear caused individuals to hide their condition from 
their family and doctors, endangering their chances of survival.
143
 
The Delaney clause was the result of scientific, medical, and social concerns 
about cancer and an attempt to shield the public from potential causes of the disease.  
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Despite its straightforward language and apparent simplicity, the Delaney amendment 
was a complex topic and a source of disagreement in both the legislative and scientific 
realms. Legislators struggled with the topics of cancer, public health, economy, industry 
productivity, and scientific methodology in designing a way to protect the public from 
chemical residues.
144
 The Food Additives Amendment accommodated industry by 
providing procedures for setting tolerances for chemical residues and the FDA by 
providing a regulatory means of protecting the public from carcinogens.
145
 
The scientific community was divided on how to determine the carcinogenicity 
of a specific material, as well as on how to set limits on its use.
146
 Disagreements over 
the use of pure and applied research as well as whether to concentrate efforts on 
prevention or cure were important dividing lines in cancer discussions. Industry, 
scientific, and legislative interpretations of those analytical processes often differed, and 
test data were interpreted differently depending upon differing professional points of 
view.
147
 Criticism of the no-tolerance position of the Delaney clause came from 
scientific and medical professionals involved in chemical toxicity studies and general 
health issues. In contrast, support for the no-tolerance position came from 
epidemiologists and cancer specialists dealing directly with the disease and its cure. 
They recognized that, although a substance that caused cancer in animals will not 
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necessarily do so in humans, an experiment that showed carcinogenicity in any test 
species cast enough doubt to warrant caution.
148
 
At the heart of the Delaney debate was the perception of causation and the 
attempt to legislate an intangible scientific concept. From the simplest perspective, an 
effect had a single cause, but a scientific perspective viewed causation as far more 
complex. Thus aminotriazole did not actually cause thyroid cancer directly. Rather the 
compound suppressed thyroid function long enough for tumors to develop as a result of 
glandular irritation. The application of large volumes of aminotriazole over time caused 
inflammation in the organ, while natural growth and cell division during these irritated 
periods eventually led to mutation and cancer. Scientifically speaking, any effect is the 
combination of all known contributing factors, not one single cause, and scientific 
investigation concluded that aminotriazole exposure could lead to cancer under certain 
circumstances. The Delaney clause, which does not allow for scientific nuances, stated 
that the possibility of cancer as a result of exposure equated to causation. The Delaney 
clause sought to avoid scientific uncertainty surrounding cancer causation and simplify 
prevention efforts by removing one of the potential factors, carcinogenic chemicals, 
from the equation.
149
 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the parent department of the 
FDA in 1959, was responsible for interpreting and enforcing the Delaney clause as well 
as assessing all available scientific research bearing on FDA activities. Because the law 
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allowed no tolerances for carcinogens in food, any evidence of carcinogenesis required 
an automatic ban to protect the public.
150
 During the cranberry scare, the chemical and 
cranberry industries took the perspective of most analytical scientists, citing little 
substantive danger to the public.
151
 
The FDA normally had the authority to set limits on levels of contamination by 
any potentially harmful chemical, but the Delaney clause eliminated any discretion in 
dealing with known or suspected carcinogens, generating an inconsistent procedural 
conflict.
152
 Chemical manufacturers were allowed to apply for tolerances or waivers for 
their products if they might end up in food and they did not cause cancer. Chemical 
industry representatives applied for such tolerance rulings on aminotriazole twice before 
the events in 1959, but the FDA refused attempts pending animal testing results.
153
 
 
Science and the development of chemical testing 
The science of food testing and analysis had close ties to the development of both 
protective legislation and the chemical industry. The need for methods to determine the 
toxicity or nutritive value of any given substance became a critical factor in the 
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development of food legislation as chemical additives became increasingly prevalent in 
the food supply.
154
 
 The development of the first artificial chemical dyes and preservatives in the mid 
1800s began a process of development that laid the groundwork for a proliferation of 
industrial chemicals through the present. Scientists had to develop a test to determine the 
presence of each new chemical, its concentration, and its effectiveness in order to 
properly evaluate its function. As the need for testing and evaluation became more 
common, systematic procedures were established to maintain scientific standards. When 
tests designed to detect specific chemicals were applied to biological processes, they 
allowed scientists to track both residues of the target chemical and breakdown 
byproducts. New more sensitive tests allowed for better analysis, which in turn allowed 
for new chemical interactions to be tested, and so forth. This system of analysis and 
reaction was a central part of FDA methodology during the cranberry scare.
155
 
The science of nutrition first developed in Germany in the 1840s following the 
pioneering studies of Justus von Liebig (1803-1873) in organic chemistry and his 
development understanding of the chemical processes of plant and animal nutrition. 
Liebig was known as an entrepreneur and teacher, as well as an innovator.
156
 Research 
into the relationship of food intake and general health took root in America in 1890 with 
Wilbur Atwater, a reform-minded chemist from Wesleyan University. Atwater was one 
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of the first to criticize the eating habits of Americans and to suggest a link between poor 
health and food consumption.
157
 Although the pace of development and introduction of 
new chemicals into the food supply increased steadily, the development of testing 
procedures was haphazard until World War II. During and after World War II, 
agricultural and manufacturing technologies increased the number of chemicals in use as 
well as their quantities. This increase in chemical consumption guided the development 
of new understanding of the interactions of those chemicals in both plant and animal 
systems.
158
 
 Social perceptions of science and food strongly influenced the public‘s response 
to the cranberry scare. The progressive development of technologies and chemicals since 
the turn of the century seemed to be ushering in an age of prosperity and plenty. The 
growing use and development of new and increasingly effective machines and 
substances increased industrial and agricultural efficiency and productivity. In turn, 
those developments and products found their way into the daily lives of the public. 
Americans in the 1950s were bombarded with advertisements for and incentives to use a 
wide spectrum of new technologies, such as television and automatic appliances 
designed to encourage integration of those technologies into the home.
159
 
 At the same time, the public was becoming increasingly aware of the potential 
dangers of the chemicals in their food. People had already learned to be concerned about 
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their food through radio, television, and printed sources. Accompanying the increasing 
number of food technologies through the 1940s and 1950s was a large increase in the 
number and types of highly processed ―junk foods‖ entering the market, such as fried 
potato and corn chips, high-calorie candy bars, and fast food. Despite the extension of 
the average life expectancy because of medical advances, a simultaneous increase in the 
incidence of several illnesses occurred, creating concerns for the nation‘s long-term 
health.
160
 People were living longer, but an increasing number were living unhealthy 
lives. The effect was most noticeable in a significant increase in death rates from heart 
disease between the 1930s and 1950s.
161
 
As evidence of the negative impacts of chemical consumption on health grew, 
including obesity, heart disease, and gastro-intestinal problems, efforts to educate the 
public also increased. Medical, chemical and pharmaceutical professionals acted as 
voices of caution concerning chemicals in food, but maintained that science and 
government were capable of handling the problems. Programs and policies to inform and 
shape the eating habits of Americans began in the 1930s and increased after World War 
II. The National Cancer Institute, created by the 1937 National Cancer Act, and the 
privately funded American Cancer Society (1915) offered public and professional 
training programs to provide current information and reduce ignorance and fear 
concerning cancer. Programs designed by the American Medical Association, the 
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American Heart Association, and the American Public Health Association set the 
standards for public understanding of cancer and the effects of chemicals in food.
162
 
The science of food analysis focused in part on the effects of additives, colorants 
and chemical residues on animal and plant biological systems. Such studies sought to 
understand the effects of chemicals on the human system through inference and 
comparison. Products and chemicals specifically intended for human consumption had to 
undergo human trials, but they were typically tested on animals first because of ethical 
concerns. After passage of the 1938 Food and Drug Act, fertilizers, insecticides, and 
herbicides not intended for human consumption, such as aminotriazole, never reached 
the human testing phase. Their toxicity data was determined from animal testing and any 
available incidental exposure data reported by chemical users.
163
 
Some early chemical testing efforts, such as Wiley‘s poison squad in 1912, 
briefly reversed the modern trend toward animal testing. Wiley chose chemicals that 
were unavoidably part of human consumption and gave them to humans at various levels 
and concentrations to determine any ill effects. Wiley‘s reports only noted short-term 
harmful effects or positive benefits. Subtle or long-term effects, such as carcinogenesis, 
were very difficult to track and associate with a given chemical.
164
 
Extrapolating a toxic effect in humans based on an observed toxic effect in 
rodents or other test animals has been common since the nineteenth century and was a 
central element in the scientific furor over the cranberry scare. Animal testing, 
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specifically on rats and mice with relatively short life spans, offers the opportunity to test 
a chemical through a complete lifespan. A thorough examination, both physically and 
chemically, allowed estimation of any positive or negative effects from long-term 
exposure.
165
 
The classification of additives and residues must make distinctions between 
directly and indirectly toxic substances. Some chemicals harm an animal or plant by 
directly affecting a biological system. Other chemicals caused toxic effects indirectly 
through the suppression or acceleration of biological activities, or through chemical 
breakdown products. Chemical analysis of the effect of any given substance must look at 
both the direct effects of a chemical at various concentrations and the effects of any 
chemicals resulting from the breakdown or digestion of the source chemical.
166
 
During the cranberry scare, some scientific experts repeatedly said that 
aminotriazole had shown no toxicity in humans, and that the levels causing acute 
toxicity in mice were equivalent to an impossible exposure level in humans.
167
 Dr. 
Edwin B. Astwood, one of the FDA scientists who conducted the tests to determine the 
carcinogenicity of aminotriazole in 1957-1958, testified before Congress about the 
harmlessness of aminotriazole in humans, as did Dr. Boyd Shaffer of the American 
Cyanamid testing team, the primary manufacturer of aminotriazole.
168
  Several other 
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professionals, including Ocean Spray President Ambrose Stevens and Dr. Arnold 
Shallock of the Rutgers Agricultural Experiment Station, said they had no concerns over 
aminotriazole‘s toxicity in humans.169 Nonetheless, the FDA and Secretary Flemming 
maintained that no one could know how much of a carcinogen was too much and that the 
law did not give them the latitude to speculate. Any given exposure might lead to cancer, 
and how low that exposure might be was unknown, so any exposure level was banned.
170
 
Both the FDA and American Cyanamid conducted tests on mice between 1957 
and 1959 to determine the effects of aminotriazole. The FDA tests provided clear 
evidence that aminotriazole was both a strong thyroid suppressant and a carcinogen in 
mice. The FDA communicated this to American Cyanamid and suggested their scientists 
focus their attention to those areas to confirm FDA findings.
171
 
The American Cyanamid performed its tests in three phases during 1958-1959 in 
preparation to request a residue tolerance from the FDA. In acute toxicity studies, rats 
were fed large doses of aminotriazole to determine a lethal dose, which was found to be 
25 grams of aminotriazole per kilogram of body weight. Sub-acute toxicity studies, run 
parallel to the acute studies, involved feeding rats 50, 250, and 1,250 parts per million 
(ppm) of aminotriazole in drinking water for 160 days. All three concentrations 
increased thyroid size.
172
 
American Cyanamid also conducted long-term feeding studies on rats and dogs. 
Rats were fed 10, 50, and 100 ppm in their drinking water for two years. More than half 
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of the subjects fed at 100 ppm had tumors by the end of the study, and tumors appeared 
less frequently at concentrations of 10 and 50 ppm. Similar studies on dogs ended after 
one year with no noticeable effect on their thyroid and no tumors, indicating that the 
chemical affected different species differently.
173
 Aminotriazole testing done with 
canines showed no thyroid suppression or tumors, and demonstrated that toxic dosages 
can vary widely by species and body mass.
174
 
Testing for contamination in a sample was a very different procedure from 
toxicity testing in live subjects. Testing for the presence of a chemical in a sample could 
be complex, depending on the nature of the sample, the concentration of the target 
chemical, and the sensitivity of the test method. Improvements in testing quality and 
sensitivity affected the results, and made it possible to use less of a chemical to better 
effect.
175
 
The FDA adapted early tests for aminotriazole to test for aminotriazole 
concentration in cranberries. The FDA used its new tests in late 1957 when reports 
indicated part of that year‘s cranberry crop was probably contaminated. The sample 
solution then went through a complex series of dilutions, evaporations, and absorptions 
involving several other compounds including hydrogen peroxide, ammonium hydroxide, 
hydrochloric acid, and chromotropic acid. The concentration of aminotriazole was 
measured spectrophotometrically by comparing the result to a standard color curve. The 
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method used in November 1959 had a low-end detection range of 0.05 ppm, a level at 
which even berries that had never been exposed to any herbicide could register false 
positive readings.
176
 
The FDA defined ―tolerance‖ as the lowest safe level of a chemical, based on 
extensive toxicity test data. The alternative to a tolerance level, proposed during the 
1951 and 1954 Delaney Hearings and discussed during the scare, was the ―de minimis‖ 
principle. ―De minimis,‖ which was derived from the Latin term de minimis non curat 
lex or ―the law does not regard trifles,‖ refers to the point at which a residue, although 
detectable, can be ignored as harmless.
177
 The cranberry industry maintained that 
aminotriazole should be treated in this fashion, but the concept was directly contrary to 
the Delaney clause, and the FDA had no legal alternative but to treat aminotriazole 
contamination as a no-tolerance situation.
178
 
As the science of chemical analysis progressed, detection of smaller and smaller 
traces of individual chemicals became possible. For chemicals without registered 
tolerances, this trend meant that residues and contamination were increasingly easy to 
detect, making the chemical increasingly subject to automatic FDA ban under the 
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Delaney clause. Theoretically, improved testing technologies could lead to an inability to 
avoid any level of ―contamination,‖ making the concept of tolerances meaningless.179  
The Delaney clause generated administrative problems and scientific controversy 
because a policy of zero tolerance left no room for scientific judgment. It barred 
industries from exploring the potential benefits of certain chemicals that might be 
valuable at low exposure levels, and forced the FDA to react against all zero-tolerance 
chemicals rather than rely on the expertise of its staff. Not only did a no-tolerance policy 
undermine the ability of the regulatory agencies to do their jobs effectively, but it also 
suppressed scientific endeavors that might otherwise generate new and useful 
technologies.
180
 
During the 1950s, the FDA had three major challenges in controlling food 
additives. Immediately harmful adulterants were easily legislated against, and were 
normally avoided by manufacturers because of the threat of negative publicity and legal 
action. Naturally toxic substances common in processed foods, such as salt and benzoic 
acid, were given tolerances or added to the list of Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) 
substances.
181
 Produce containing carcinogens, such as turnips and rutabagas that 
naturally contain more aminotriazole-like toxins per kilogram than any degree of 
contamination found during the scare, were exempt from the Delaney clause.
182
 The 
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most difficult task was determining the nature and toxicity of long-term chemical 
threats.
183
  
In addition to the acute toxicity of some substances, one of the central scientific 
issues in the management of potential health problems from food additives was that 
many caused no immediate harm. Lawmakers were hesitant to legislate against the use 
of chemicals that might or might not be problematic.
184
 Testing to determine any long-
term effects of chemicals without known short-term effects has been central theme in 
chemical residues testing since the turn of the 20
th
 century. Aminotriazole, the 
potentially carcinogenic herbicide involved in the cranberry scare, was exactly such a 
chemical. Although tests showed that large scale ingestion in animals over long periods 
could generate thyroid tumors, incidental exposure and single, high-dose exposure in 
humans produced no lasting toxicity. Medical communities considered its ability to 
temporarily suppress thyroid function a marked benefit, and some endocrinologists in 
1959 considered it a drug for that purpose.
185
 
In many ways the cranberry scare was a scientific phenomenon as well as a 
legislative and social one. Scientists discovered the chemical that was at the center of the 
scare, as well as the tests for carcinogenicity and residues. Scientists worked directly 
with legislators and helped set the standards that led to the Delaney clause. Without the 
close interrelationship of science and legislation in creating the circumstances of the 
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scare, the public might never have suspected their cranberries were not pure and 
wholesome. 
The cranberry scare demonstrated the vulnerability of the food industry as well 
as American society to misinformation, lack of administrative preparation, and shifting 
public perception of food concerns. It also opened the eyes of both industry and 
government to issues concerning chemicals in food that had been building over the 
previous decades, and it showed that reevaluation of procedures would be necessary to 
deal with future problems. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FEAR, TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA 
One housewife whom we know says she dumped her prepared cranberry 
jellies into the garbage can, then sat down and smoked a cigarette in relief 
at having just been saved from cancer.
186
 
 
Fear, technology, and the media were central themes throughout the cranberry 
scare. This chapter explores the nature of food fears in society and the technologies that 
made the scare possible, with a focus on media technologies as the most central means 
of transmitting information and generating confusion.  
A degree of fear has been a constant in human society. The emotion plays a 
necessary psychological function within human societies, providing focus, direction, and 
strength. Fears, especially those that provide a common experience or communal 
gathering point such as fear of epidemic or fear of a common enemy, are positive 
elements of an overall societal outlook. But when the concerns on both the individual 
and the societal levels become irrational, uncontrolled, or disruptive, society suffers.
187
 
In all human societies, abundant, quality food is a necessity for life and happiness. Food 
and its availability shape every facet of a society‘s daily existence. An inability to trust 
the food supply can generate anxiety and erode trust in leadership.
188
 The cranberry 
scare was a good example of how social anxiety and the necessity of food can combine 
to generate strong social reaction. 
 
186 ―A Nation Without Cranberry Sauce,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 11, 1959, p. 40. 
187 Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea, 1-30. 
188 McIntosh, Sociologies of Food and Nutrition, 42-47. 
  
73 
Several fear factors combined in the cranberry scare, including societal anxiety, 
fear of food contamination, and fear of cancer. One important factor revolved around the 
relationship between food and politics. The central factors in the quick and efficient 
spread of the concern over contaminated cranberries were television, radio, and 
newspapers. The day after the news conference during which Secretary Flemming 
announced the FDA‘s concerns, most major newspapers carried front-page stories about 
cranberries and chemical contamination. Television and radio stories spread the word 
instantly. Some reported the story as it occurred, and others heightened the fear with 
commentary and panicked reaction. Confusion and panic were the inevitable results.
189
 
 
Societal fear  
Change is a primary generator of fear and anxiety in an individual or in society. 
Change is generally resisted unless circumstances or information make the alteration 
desired or necessary. Therefore changes in something as important as the food we eat 
never occur in a social vacuum. Changes in the nature and availability of the food 
supply, especially basic staples, often have had far reaching effects on society, including 
population shifts, political revolution, and war. Similarly, changes in the social, 
industrial, and political structures within a society could affect the food supply. The 
combination of these effects places food at the very center of society‘s concerns.190 
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 The 1950s in the United States was a period of shifting national personalities. 
There was a distinct divide between the contemporary perception of the decade as 
portrayed by the media and the historical reality of the 1950s, especially when compared 
to the 1960s. The media helped to generate a positive image of the decade as a 
technologically advanced and domestically utopian period. Much of the revolutionary 
technology, such as kitchen appliances, was focused on the home, but television and the 
chemical industries added their own contributions to societal change. This age of plenty 
and easy living held science and technology as the hopes for both the present and the 
future. Conservative values were the political and social norm, at least in print.
191
 
In contrast, underlying the apparently placid social climate of the late 1950s was 
an array of social tensions. The Great Depression, two world wars, and the hardships 
associated with them had left indelible marks in the minds of the public. Specters of the 
recent past, the heightening Cold War, smoldering civil rights issues, and an ever-present 
―threat‖ of the dissolution of the American way helped to create a general climate of 
anxiety and fear within the American collective consciousness of 1959. The ever-present 
threats of the ―red menace‖ and atomic war weighed heavily.192 
Some of the social tension was apparent in contemporary literature. Arthur 
Miller‘s The Crucible (1953) and W.H Auden‘s The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue 
(1947) were telling examples of literary social criticism. Both works represented of 
contemporary public hysteria and criticized of the loss of core conservative values. In 
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contrast, W.T. Lhamon‘s Deliberate Speed (2002) and Eric Goldman‘s The Crucial 
Decade – and After (1960) characterized the era as one of social and political 
complacency.
193
 Widespread change in technology, social structure, international 
political stability, and material culture created uncertainty in the minds of the American 
public.
194
 
 
Shifting food patterns  
Each shift in the development of American society through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries affected cranberries and their relationship to American society and 
food patterns. Increased distribution, visibility, and availability, as well as increased 
production, all helped put cranberries on most American Thanksgiving and Christmas 
dinner tables.
195
 
The well-documented population shift from dispersed rural areas to urban centers 
throughout the early twentieth century disrupted the average individual‘s access to fresh 
foods. The accompanying shift from non-money to money economies in cities made 
acquisition of agricultural products through barter very difficult.
196
 The late nineteenth 
century had witnessed the beginning of a shift from fresh produce as the most common 
foodstuff to processed foods. As the type of foods changed to processed and canned or 
packaged foods, the amounts of added chemicals in the average person‘s diet 
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skyrocketed. The ease and availability of acquiring fresh foods was greatly reduced in 
the burgeoning cities, exacerbating the problem.
197
 The development of a wide variety of 
prepackaged and processed convenience foods during the 1940s and 1950s contributed 
to a shift in the perception of eating itself. The modern trend was toward quick, easy, and 
―ready to eat‖, while home-made and cooking from scratch became quaint luxuries or 
even low status cooking methods.
198
 
Chicago provided an excellent example of the sequence of technological and 
social events occurring around the country, including large-scale population growth, 
infrastructure development, and transportation revolutions. As the closest major city to 
Wisconsin, Chicago‘s industrial and metropolitan development strongly affected the 
development of the cranberry industry in the region. From completely natural bogs, hand 
picking, and wagon transportation in 1861, through railroads and the interstate highway 
system, the production and distribution of Wisconsin cranberries mirrored the growth 
and success of their largest neighbor.
199
 As the Chicago region developed and the 
population grew, demand for foods grew, spurring new bog development. Industry then 
accommodated the ready market by building processing plants and distribution 
systems.
200
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Food fear and other fears   
Trust was one of the central elements of the public‘s anxiety during the cranberry 
scare. A population must, as a whole, be confident in its food supply and trust that it will 
remain abundant and pure. The history of food and its processing and consumption 
demonstrated that abundant food was not always the case. The inability of a person or 
society to trust the food supply can lead to conflict and social chaos. Thus the public 
developed a longstanding mistrust and fear based on real concerns.
201
 
The long history of food fear was a central element in the cranberry scare. The 
laws enacted to protect the public from outright lies, ineffectual herbal remedies, ―snake 
oils‖, and other forms of food misinformation left gaps and required updating. The 
newest threats of chemicals and adulteration of the food supply in 1959, such as 
persistent pesticides, animal growth hormones, and industrial wastes, threatened to 
poison whole populations rather than individuals.
202
 
Trust in government and political leaders, the media, and public servants were 
also important elements during the cranberry scare. Although some segments of the 
population viewed governmental cynically, most citizens took government action 
seriously. If the government said people should be afraid, they were afraid. 
Another critical element of the scare was the general lack of knowledge about 
cancer and its potential relationship to chemicals and food. In 1959, cancer was very 
misunderstood, frightening and an almost universal death sentence. Statistics indicated a 
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rising incidence of the disease bordering on an epidemic. Hysteria over anything thought 
to cause it was a predictable response.
203
  Even the simple use of the word cancer incited 
fear. As one reporter noted, ―Growers regard the repeated use of the two words cancer 
and cranberries in the same sentence as a harmful, if not lethal, coupling of thought in 
the public mind.‖ 204 
Several other social stresses also weighed on the American public in 1959. The 
ever-present fear of Cold War nuclear annihilation appeared in the constant flow of 
newspaper articles about Soviet military buildup and international conflict.
205
 The 
general political climate of foreign and domestic conflict created widespread social 
tension. The ending of the Korean conflict, followed by the French defeat in Viet Nam 
and the division of North and South Viet Nam were background stresses.
206
 Social unrest 
and racial tensions were also strong elements of the general environment of social 
tension in the U.S. during the scare.
207
 
    
Technology and media 
Although the 1950s was a period of technological innovation and integration of 
the new technologies into daily life, there was nonetheless a generalized fear of 
technology surrounding the pace of integration. Integration of new technologies into the 
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fabric of society and daily life meant change, and change generated anxiety. Rapid 
development and integration of new technologies changed society in unexpected ways 
and led to misunderstanding and confusion by outpacing society‘s ability to fully 
integrate a new technology before the next one was introduced.
208
 The introduction of 
synthetic compounds in industry, the accompanying growth and proliferation of the 
economic impact of those industries, and resultant difficulties with residues, disposal, 
and cleanup of the compounds is an excellent example of the problem. 
Throughout these broad social changes, technology remained a constant factor 
driving the various forces. Media technologies, such as radio and television, and their 
availability to the public made information transfer almost instantaneous. Developments 
in farming technology provided ever increasing productivity. The burgeoning chemical 
industry provided technologies to achieve undreamt of health and prosperity in the form 
of safer abundant foods. Processing, packaging, and refrigeration provided technology 
for safe storage and consumption of foods, greatly extending their shelf lives. 
Technologies in the home, such as electric refrigerators, dishwashers, and television 
reshaped the American household.
209
 
Technology in several forms was a catalyst throughout the scare. Manufactured 
chemicals, production processes, and scientific testing all helped to generate an 
environment of public concern. The chemical industry, the creation and tailoring of 
chemicals to specific uses and the need to understand their effects all involved 
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technologies critical to the genesis of the scare. The scientific testing procedures used to 
analyze and assess aminotriazole also fueled the scare by demonstrating how difficult it 
was to know whether cranberries were contaminated.
210
 How and where people got their 
information was important during the scare. 
The information gathering habits of the American public in 1959 were very 
similar to those of today. People gathered much of their information about society and 
local, regional, and national happenings directly from the media. This media-centered 
environment for gathering information created a focal point for the transmission of 
political and social agendas. People tended to decide how they thought and felt based on 
what they saw or heard in the media, and the tone and agenda of the media had a 
substantial influence.
211
 How people used and perceived their news sources in 1959 was 
an important part of the conjunction of fear and technology in the cranberry scare. The 
various forms of public media were both leisure activity and source of serious 
information, but how the information was perceived made the difference in an 
individual‘s response. Americans were conditioned from the turn of the twentieth 
century to take media and the news seriously.
212
  
The authority of the written word, as well as broadcast media, has long had 
power. People have tended to believe and take seriously things they heard from 
authoritative sources, no matter what they heard. Orson Welles‘ famous broadcast of The 
War of the Worlds was a perfect example. Although only a small percentage of people 
 
210 Jukes and Shaffer, "Antithyroid Effects of Aminotriazole," 296-97. 
211 Friedman, Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science, 43-55. 
212 Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, Mccarthyism, and American Culture, 1-18. 
  
81 
were confused by the radio drama, it was telling that even a small percentage of 
Americans would react hysterically to something so clearly fictional. During the 
cranberry scare, the public heard a story of possible chemical poisoning, the spread of 
potentially incurable disease, and the battle waged against these threats. A strong 
reaction was predictable, whether or not the scientific and political information was 
accurate and clear.
213
 
The ability to disseminate information quickly and effectively both contributed to 
and eventually defused the public fear reaction during the scare. Although the initial 
FDA news conference itself was not televised live, the story entered the radio and 
television airwaves within hours. Both television and radio, like the telegraph and 
telephone, largely eliminated communication delays that might otherwise have helped 
limit the scope of the scare.
214
 The day after the news conference, most major 
newspapers featured front-page stories on cranberries and chemical contamination, such 
as ―Northwest Cranberries Ordered Off Market‖ and ―Some of Cranberry Crop Tainted 
by Weed-Killer, U.S. Warns.‖ Some reported the story as it developed, providing 
meaningful scientific discussion, while others commented on the political and economic 
situations. The result was an often contradictory mixture of opinion and fact.
 215
 
Industry leaders and politicians, particularly Ocean Spray General Manager 
Ambrose Stevens and Senator John Kennedy, appeared on radio and television in 
defense of cranberries. Both men opposed the FDA ban as unnecessary, although they 
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also acknowledged that it was within Secretary Flemming‘s authority. Their attempts to 
calm fears may have had some effect, but despite a generally balanced number of articles 
favoring the FDA or the cranberry industry, public opinion leaned toward concern.
216
 
Newspapers, radio, and television increased the tension during the scare, not by 
spreading false information, but by continuing to focus on the story. Without the 
consistent reporting of the inherently anxiety-producing and scientifically controversial 
material, the public might not have reacted so strongly. Newspapers spread most 
information about the cranberry scare, but television and radio were close competitors. I 
found no records indicating how many times or in what detail the broadcast media 
covered the scare, but television spread much of the immediate concern in the first few 
days. Newspapers and magazines continued the coverage through December 1959.
217
  
An estimated 44 million American households, approximately 86% of the total, 
owned at least one television set in 1959, while radio was almost universal in the 
American home. Based on advertising revenue statistics, television was edging out radio 
as the primary source of news and entertainment two to one.
218
 Television was also a 
focal point for Cold War fears and imagery, including public service broadcasts about 
sheltering from nuclear blasts and the anti-communist crusades of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy (R-Wis).
219
 The broad appeal of television and its ability to transmit 
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information and imagery instantly across the entire U.S. were major elements in the 
spread of the cranberry scare. 
The cranberry scare not only affected the cranberry industry but also changed the 
holiday menus of millions of Americans. Despite its brief duration and the complete lack 
of any recorded cases of aminotriazole-related health problems, the scare infected 
millions of American households with confusion and panic. The events of November 
and December 1959 consumed innumerable hours of media and administrative time, 
forced scientific institutions all over the nation to drop their projects to test cranberries, 
and set an entire industry on the edge of financial ruin.
220
 
Public uncertainty or fear is a construction of several societal factors. Geographic 
distinctions and separations, group psychology, socio-economic factors, and even factors 
such as race, gender, and age in a population can have effects on the prevalent 
uncertainties.
221
 Although social tension or scientific misunderstanding did not directly 
cause the cranberry scare, both helped set the stage for the event. The public responded 
to the scare and the subsequent media coverage with fear and confusion, mirroring the 
inconsistent and confusing response across the American media spectrum, including 
newspaper, radio, and television.
222
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CHAPTER V 
THE CRANBERRY SCARE OF 1959 
 
From the standpoint of the cranberry industry, the cranberry scare occurred at 
one of the most inopportune moments possible. The cranberry industry in 1959 was as 
strong as it had ever been in terms of both productivity and crop values. Crop yields met 
or exceeded all expectations for the season, continuing the growth trend of the industry 
begun in the 1940s. Although overall bog acreage was slowly decreasing, improving 
technologies promised ever greater productivity per acre throughout the industry. Prices 
were at record levels, and expectations for future development and increased yields were 
high.
223
 
Marketing and advertising of cranberries began to be a factor in cranberry 
distribution in the early 1930‘s with the development of several large berry cooperatives. 
The 1922 Capper-Volstead Act, which provided limited exemptions from antitrust 
prosecution for farmers marketing their products as a group, enabled the new cranberry 
cooperatives.
224
  Berry marketing and consumption maintained a strong regional 
character based on local organizations and traditional tastes. Berries, especially fresh and 
frozen, were marketed in a wide array of varieties under numerous labels. Advertising 
and marketing on a national scale were weak elements of the cranberry industry until the 
1950s.
 225
 Ocean Spray was the primary innovator marketing nationally by consolidating 
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advertising efforts and offering innovative cranberry products during non-holiday 
periods.
226
 
Increased efforts to find new markets resulted in a large increase in processed 
cranberries, including jams, juices, and dried berries, from 17% of the crop in 1934 to 
57% in 1954. As a result, per capita consumption of canned versus fresh berries doubled 
between 1934 and 1954.
227
 A 1958 market survey concluded that sales of fresh and 
processed berries were out of proportions with production but did not interpret the 
problem as an industry crisis. The report suggested that the best way to reduce the 
annual industry surplus was to increase the sales of fresh berries.
228
 
In a September 18, 1959 letter to the membership of the Ocean Spray 
cooperative, Ocean Spray General Manager Ambrose Stevens speculated that the 
existing pace of orders would dispose of the entire 1958 crop before the harvest in 1959. 
Although much of the 1958 crop would still not be shipped before the new harvest, 
selling the entire crop would result in no carryover for the first time in many years. 
Stevens labeled disposing of an entire year‘s crop through sales and future orders 
without a substantial carryover as ―utopia third class.‖ He proposed that ―utopia second 
class,‖ the total shipment of a previous crop before a new harvest, might occur before 
1965 with the help of new products and marketing campaigns.
229
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The economic state of the industry was a different story. Although the canning 
and distribution of cranberry products remained profitable, increasing overproduction 
was making the crop less profitable for the farmer, who often had to wait until the 
middle of the following year to be paid for last year‘s crop. The carryover problem had 
become worse every year for the previous decade, averaging between 200,000 and 
300,000 barrels, or 7% to 31% of the annual crop, carried over annually since 1949. 
Annual carryovers put a great deal of pressure on the farming, canning and distribution 
industries to find a way to handle the surplus before the next year‘s harvest.230 
An important contribution to the growing cranberry productivity was the 
development of increasingly effective agricultural chemicals. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture approved the herbicide Aminotriazole, also known by the trade names 
Amitrole and Weedazol and synthesized chiefly by American Cyanamid and the 
AmChem Co., in 1953 for use on pest grasses and weeds. Although not immediately 
approved for use in cranberry bogs, the compound quickly became a staple for managing 
spring weeds. It was a popular and effective compound that targeted certain weed 
species, such as poison ivy and wheat grass, but did not damage the cranberry vines or 
fruit due to their different growing cycles. Aminotriazole was widely used in the 
Northwestern growing region, where pest plants were a serious problem.
231
 
The properties of aminotriazole, a synthetic, colorless, odorless, crystalline 
powder, had been under investigation since its discovery by the American Chemical 
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Paint Company in 1952. Aminotriazole (3-amino-1, 2, 4-triazole) is a chlorophyll 
inhibitor. Chlorophyll inhibitors induce chlorosis, or the inability of the plant to produce 
chlorophyll, in new leaves and reduce growth overall.
232
 When ingested by some 
mammals, aminotriazole acts as a thyroid suppressant, temporarily reducing glandular 
activity. The effect is reversible with time, and there is no evidence of accumulation of 
aminotriazole or any metabolic byproducts in tissues.
233
 Aminotriazole exhibits longer 
persistence in soil or water than other similar herbicides, with a half-life of 
approximately 56 days.
234
 
The USDA approved the non-food use of aminotriazole in 1956, and only 
approved it for use on cranberry bogs in 1958. The FDA was aware in 1956 that 
aminotriazole could be drawn into the plant‘s systems and be deposited in the 
developing cranberries. USDA instructions for use in cranberry bogs specified only post-
harvest use to avoid the possibility of contaminating developing fruit. If used before the 
emergence of the fruit buds, no detectable residue remained within or on the ripe fruit. 
USDA guidelines allowed a very narrow window, which constrained the already tightly 
scheduled cranberry harvest.
235
 Industry, government and cooperative instructions 
carefully warned against improper use of the chemical. Use guidelines circulated 
throughout the industry in the form of grower association newsletters and chemical 
industry notices from 1957 through 1959. The Massachusetts Extension Service 
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produced and distributed nationally a detailed educational program for farmers and 
processors in all major growing regions.
236
 
 Despite the efforts to educate growers in the use of aminotriazole, some 
intentionally or unintentionally failed to comply. Roughly 40% of the 1957 cranberry 
crop from Washington and Oregon contained aminotriazole residues, indicating a major 
failure of instruction in that region. The industry voluntarily quarantined the 
contaminated crops pending a determination by the FDA on tolerances, and the FDA 
warned the industry that no residues would be allowed. American Cyanamid attempted 
twice in 1957 and 1958 to get aminotriazole registered with a tolerance of 0.7 parts per 
million. The FDA refused the first application on the grounds that the FDA had not yet 
completed its chemical testing to determine the biological properties of the substance. 
The second application was refused because American Cyanamid‘s completed research 
data indicated that the weed-killer was a carcinogen. All applications were withdrawn by 
American Cyanamid in May 1959, and the FDA officially notified the cranberry industry 
of its findings on aminotriazole in June.
237
  
With millions of pounds of the 1957 and 1958 crops in storage and a great deal 
riding on FDA approval, the industry was aware of the potential consequences of further 
misuse of aminotriazole in the bogs. Before the announcement of aminotriazole as a 
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carcinogen, cranberry industry leaders expected some degree of tolerance to be set. 
Thus, the June no tolerance announcement came as a surprise.
238
 
As a result of the announcement, the NCA, the largest and most influential of the 
cranberry cooperatives, reiterated its position: 
At the present time, aminotriazole can be used on cranberries only in 
approved post-harvest applications. No tolerance for this substance in 
cranberries has been established. Berries from cranberry vines which have 
been treated with aminotriazole in any manner other than the approved post-
harvest application will not be accepted by [the] National Cranberry 
Association.
239
 
 
A September 18, 1959, special letter to the industry from the NCA noted that the zero 
tolerance ruling was dangerous and the industry could not afford even one violation. It 
warned, ―Ocean Spray will not accept or receive cranberries from members whose 
plantations have been treated in any manner whatsoever with aminotriazole if the 
treatment took place after the date of the receipt of this letter.‖ This amounted to a total 
ban within the Ocean Spray cooperative, and required signed certification, under 
penalties of perjury, that individual growers had not used aminotriazole on the 1959 crop 
after the initial September warnings.
240
 
Contamination of the 1957 crop led to FDA seizures of large amounts of Oregon 
cranberries pending analysis. Continued use of aminotriazole suggested possible 
contamination of the 1958 and 1959 crops. The FDA did not test the 1958 crop during 
that growing season, because the FDA assumed that its seizure actions and warnings in 
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1957 would curtail improper use of aminotriazole.
241
 The FDA‘s formal refusal to set a 
tolerance for residues of aminotriazole meant the eventual destruction of the 
contaminated portion of the 1957 crop in quarantine and made further investigation 
inevitable. The FDA began gathering information on aminotriazole use on the 1958 and 
1959 crops in July 1959 immediately after the no-tolerance announcement. Testing of 
the 1959 crop began in October 1959 using a new process developed by the FDA 
designed specifically for aminotriazole residues.
242
 
 On November 7 Secretary Flemming contacted Ocean Spray president George 
P. Olssen and general manager Ambrose E. Stevens. Stevens confirmed that no one had 
checked for aminotriazole on the 1958 crop and that growers might have shipped some 
contaminated lots in 1959.
243
 One day later Commissioner Larrick and Secretary 
Flemming decided to announce their findings to the public after confirming that several 
batches of contaminated 1959 berries shipped across state lines reached markets in the 
Northwest.
244
 
On November 9, 1959, HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming announced to the press 
at his regular weekly press conference that FDA investigators had found residues of 
aminotriazole, resulting from improper application, on portions of the 1959 cranberry 
crop from Oregon and Washington State, and that the chemical caused cancer in 
laboratory animals. Similar residues had resulted in the quarantine and destruction of 
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approximately three million pounds of cranberries from the 1957 season. Secretary 
Flemming pointed out that the cranberry industry was willingly cooperating in the 
testing for contamination and the destruction of any tainted cranberries.
245
 When asked 
about the ability of the public to determine the safety of the cranberry products already 
on the market, Secretary Flemming replied that there was no way for the average 
consumer to know whether the cranberry products on the shelves and in their pantries 
were safe to consume. His advice was to be on the safe side and not buy or use them.
246
 
Secretary Flemming was well prepared with technical facts and industry data, 
and he was well aware of the potential consequences of his statements. It is possible that 
had he not mentioned the concerns over aminotriazole and had worked with the industry 
to eliminate the problematic compound, the scare would never have occurred. However, 
the law was clear, and Flemming‘s choice was limited to the nature and severity of the 
warning to be issued. He did not have the latitude to bypass FDA warning procedures to 
soften the potential blow to the cranberry industry. His cautionary statement was the 
spark that generated the sudden firestorm of media and administrative activity that 
became the cranberry scare. The announcement spread quickly on television and radio 
stations and into every major newspaper in the US by November 10
th
. Although the 
federal government did not actually ban or restrict the sale of cranberries or cranberry 
products, Flemming‘s warning had an ―immediate and drastic effect‖ on both the public 
and the industry.
247
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The cranberry industry was poorly prepared to deal with the sudden onslaught of 
attention from both the government and public. Composed of many hundreds of 
independent growers and grower associations across the nation, the cranberry industry 
had no central authority to defend it from negative publicity. Ocean Spray, the largest of 
the grower associations (representing 70-75% of cranberry producers) and a central 
figure in all cranberry industry decisions, took the lead in trying to stave off complete 
disaster.
248
 Flemming notified the cranberry industry leaders of the pending statements 
the evening before the press conference, but refused industry efforts to forestall the 
announcement. The FDA accepted Olssen‘s request to add a statement indicating the 
industry was working on a plan to segregate contaminated and uncontaminated berries 
and Steven‘s request for a statement that the industry was cooperating fully with the 
investigation.
249
 
Secretary Flemming‘s announcement just before the holiday season was the 
worst possible timing for the cranberry industry. By early November, more than half of 
the year‘s crop was in one of the many stages of harvesting and sorting or in warehouses 
awaiting sale or processing.
250
 Flemming‘s statements triggered cancellations of orders 
and an almost complete cessation of processing.
251
 Widespread fear of contamination 
prompted nationwide supermarket bans of all cranberry products and the removal of 
cranberry products from store shelves throughout the United States. Newspapers pulled 
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ads involving cranberry products, and stores suggested alternatives to cranberry sauce 
for holiday meals and recipes, such as applesauce and spiced pears. Restaurants removed 
cranberries and cranberry products from their menus. The military restricted the 
distribution of cranberry products to servicemen abroad. Orders for cranberries were 
halted nationwide, freezing the shipment of millions of pounds of berries.
252
 
The sudden and intense public reaction surprised both industry and government. 
Although the FDA was aware of the potential consequences of the timing, Secretary 
Flemming chose to make the announcement, citing public safety concerns. He feared 
that delaying the announcement and testing would expose the public to a potentially 
dangerous chemical.
253
 The Eisenhower administration found itself scrambling to 
alleviate the sudden problem. The USDA focused on finding ways to relieve the stress 
on the industry, and the President‘s staff worked to bring the USDA and HEW to a 
consensus. Meetings including Secretary Benson, Secretary Flemming, and President 
Eisenhower‘s staff showed they were working together, but underscored the 
communication gaps between the USDA and HEW.
254
 The USDA and the HEW 
pressured President Eisenhower from different angles not only to take sides in the 
departmental conflict but also to take a stronger stand in public. The president left White 
House involvement in the issue to his science advisor, George Kistiakowski, who took 
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charge of communicating between the White House and the various committees, 
departments, and officials involved.
255
 
The USDA and FDA exhibited clear differences in opinion and focus about 
chemical regulation and protecting the public. The FDA and its parent department HEW 
were concerned with protection of the public and administration of The Food, Drugs, 
and Cosmetics Act. The USDA was concerned more with the industry and farmers 
during the scare. The events of the scare underscored the need for improved 
communication between the USDA and the FDA.
256
 Secretary Benson of the USDA was 
refused opportunity to review Flemming‘s press statements before the conference, and 
he had no opportunity to insert or suggest alternative wording or explanation. He was 
told that Secretary Flemming did not approve press releases until just before the 
conference. The White House was also not informed prior to the announcement.
257
 This 
communication disparity would become a larger administrative issue later in the scare. 
The FDA began immediately to determine the extent of the contamination, as 
well as to calm the public. Samples all over the United States were sent to state and 
federal testing facilities for analysis. In addition to FDA scientists, state agricultural 
departments, agricultural experiment stations, and universities cooperated and conducted 
the very time consuming and detailed process of detecting and measuring the minute 
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amounts of the chemical.
258
 Canned products produced with berries from 1957 and 1958 
were also tested to determine whether contamination was present after processing.
259
 
 Lots of berries awaiting results were quarantined, and contaminated lots were 
seized and destroyed. Many bogs remained un-harvested, so some berries remained on 
the vine. The contaminated berries that caused the initial stir were from northwestern 
bogs, where the environment typically required heavier use of chemicals to control pest 
species. Nonetheless, the FDA tested samples from all growing regions, preventing any 
one region from making up the marketing shortfall of another. The FDA eventually 
reported contamination in all three primary growing regions, although many farmers in 
those regions denied ever using aminotriazole. Misuse of aminotriazole before the 
industry ban went into effect or by growers outside the major cooperatives could still 
have resulted in residues and was possibly the source of some contaminated lots.
260
 
Some contamination possibly resulted from spraying by road crews not associated with 
the nearby cranberry bogs, but the speculation was never confirmed.
261
 
Secretary Flemming scheduled a public meeting for November 18 so that the 
cranberry industry could offer its plan to segregate contaminated berries from clean. The 
heart of the plan was the cooperative testing of berries between the FDA and cranberry 
industry laboratories to speed the process of returning berries to the shelves, and the 
labeling and subsequent announcement of cleared batches. An important element of the 
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event was a call from cranberry industry leaders to help reverse the trend of ―fear 
hysteria‖ and to restore confidence in the industry‘s products.262 Industry leaders and 
congressional leaders from cranberry-growing states supported the proposed plan, citing 
its effectiveness and urgency.
263
 
The scientific quandary driving the cranberry scare resulted from the restrictions 
of the Delaney Clause and the FDA‘s statutory inability to set a residue tolerance for 
aminotriazole. During the scare, FDA testing only had to find the threshold amount in a 
sample to declare it contaminated. In the case of aminotriazole, the FDA test could 
determine contamination at 0.05 parts per million.
264
 Experimentation during the scare 
itself significantly streamlined the test, resulting in a more accurate test sequence by 
December 1959. The reported 50% increase in sensitivity led to a predictable increase in  
contamination discoveries late in December, as the more efficient test could detect much 
smaller concentrations of aminotriazole. Because the test only had to detect 
aminotriazole reliably at any level, the new test bypassed determination of concentration 
and focused on detection.
265
 
The FDA destroyed the 4.8 million pounds of contaminated berries voluntarily 
set aside from the 1957 crop without testing any of the rest of that year‘s 100 million 
pound crop. The FDA tested the 1958 and 1959 crops simultaneously. Canners had 
processed most of the 1958 crop before testing, and only one instance of contamination 
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was found in the tested samples. The processing may have broken down the 
aminotriazole or diluted it below detectable levels.
266
 FDA investigators found 
approximately 0.3% of the overall 1959 crop to be contaminated, as well as 
contamination in samples from all three growing regions. Testing ceased in January 
1960.
267
 Despite the continued presence of aminotriazole residues in 1959, this drop in 
contamination from 5% in 1957 to 0.3% in 1959 probably resulted from the industry-
wide ban placed on the chemical. 
Although cranberries labeled as being aminotriazole-free were available in most 
regions by Thanksgiving, sales of cranberry products were down to 20% of normal, and 
many stores and restaurants left cranberries off their shelves and menus entirely. 
Industry sales returned to near-normal levels by Christmas, but by then the damage had 
been done.
268
 After the depressing 1959 Thanksgiving season, USDA Secretary Benson 
proposed an intensive marketing effort to help the cranberry industry. In conjunction 
with continued labeling and Secretary Benson‘s support, industry officials sought to 
enlist the aid of other industries and the media in restoring positive public perception of 
cranberries before Christmas.
269
  The cranberry industry also planned to spend more on 
marketing and publicity to help restore its image as well as to open markets for new 
cranberry products, although it did not help cranberry sales in the short-term.
270
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The nature and timing of the scare played directly into public uncertainties and 
fears. Concern over the purity and safety of food had been part of American popular 
culture for more than a century by the time of the scare. Articles, books and popular 
concerns over processing and chemicals in food, including Upton Sinclair‘s The Jungle, 
created significant public concern. Dangerously contaminated products, FDA seizures 
and investigations, and public anxiety helped set the stage in 1959.
271
 Medical 
misunderstanding and a general fear of cancer also played into public fears.
272
 The 
combination of all these factors in one event, at a time when the information spread 
around the nation almost instantly, provided a perfect environment for the cranberry 
scare. 
Secretary Flemming prepared his November 9 press conference based on the 
confirmed contamination in 1957 and the refusal to set a tolerance for aminotriazole in 
1958 and 1959. He reacted immediately in defense of the public when he learned that 
contaminated berries had been shipped to market in Oregon.
273
 Secretary Flemming‘s 
claims about aminotriazole residues on some cranberries were never in question. 
However, cranberry officials immediately questioned the timing of his announcement as 
unnecessarily destructive of industry reputation and considered it an unnecessarily 
punitive action.
274
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1960 was a presidential election year, and rumors of Flemming‘s place as a 
possible Vice Presidential candidate appeared in cranberry scare editorials.
275
 Secretary 
Flemming never acknowledged such desires.
276
 Industry and political opponents, 
particularly within the USDA, made accusations of political grandstanding.
277
 The main 
charge was that Flemming provided little indication of the extent of the contamination, 
which the public assumed was universal without guidance to the contrary. The initial 
November 9
th
 press release and several subsequent FDA press releases about the scare 
noted that both fresh and processed berries were suspect and that the buying public was 
unable to determine whether they were contaminated.
278
 Widespread industry protests 
and numerous calls for Secretary Flemming‘s resignation from both private individuals 
and the cranberry industry reached President Eisenhower‘s desk.279 
Monday, November 9
th
, 1959, became known as ―Black Monday‖ in the 
cranberry industry. The weeks following Secretary Flemming‘s announcement were the 
industry‘s lowest point in terms of financial loss and industry reputation. Government 
compensation and industry efforts at damage control helped save the industry as a 
whole, but damage had been done.
280
 
The scare and the destabilization it caused began a process of industry 
restructuring that took more than a decade to run its course. Hundreds of small 
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independent growers were wiped out. Some unusual or rare berry varieties ceased to 
exist on the market, replaced by more productive commercial varieties. Large growers, 
who could better weather the financial storm, took the opportunity to acquire prime bog 
acreage cheaply, which increased the market strength of the major cooperatives over 
independent farmers. This shift continued the trend of increasing production by a 
decreasing number of producers with larger individual acreages.
281
 
The cranberry scare of 1959 fit the definition of a ―scare‖ as a widespread 
societal disturbance based on fears rather than immediate dangers. During a scare, 
people‘s fears and reactions are based on a lack of information or poor information 
rather than on a full understanding of the topic, and the events are often characterized by 
fears that continue long after the actual problem has been solved. Technology and 
science are common elements of a scare, as both subjects and facilitators.
282
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CHAPTER VI 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND OFFICIAL RESPONSES THROUGH NEWSPAPERS 
This chapter analyzes the media response to the scare, as well as the responses 
and interactions of President Eisenhower‘s administration, Secretary Flemming and the 
FDA, and other political figures in comparison to the responses of the cranberry and 
chemical industries. The responses of political figures are important because they 
represent the perspectives of those forced to deal with the scare from leadership 
perspectives, rather than from positions of fear or loss of livelihood. The cranberry and 
chemical industry responses contrast strongly with the political responses. 
 Although a survey of newspapers and magazines is not directly indicative of the 
thoughts of 1959 Americans, it does provide some indication of how various geographic 
regions reacted to the scare.
283
 Ten newspapers were chosen based on their proximity to 
cranberry growing regions or as representatives of metropolitan centers in non-growing 
regions. Each was surveyed for articles relating to cranberries, cancer, science, and the 
FDA and Secretary Flemming between November 9, 1959 and January 1960. All of 
them demonstrated commonalities in reporting coverage involving well publicized 
events, which were widely distributed through the media and FDA press releases. 
The month long debate over cranberries and aminotriazole in the media served to 
generate confusion and fear. The fear generated was likely more damaging to the 
cranberry industry than the facts themselves.
284
 The combination of reporter‘s scientific 
 
283 Iain Wilkinson, "News Media Discourse and the State of Public Opinion on Risk," Risk Management 1, no. 4 
(1999), 21-31. 
284 Friedman, Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science, 81-91, 122-23. 
  
102 
backgrounds, personal views, limited access to source material, and journalistic time 
constraints were all possible causal factors in the confusion. Very few instances of 
reporting covered both sides of the aminotriazole controversy. The media coverage of 
the scare generally confirmed this dichotomy between effective reporting and scientific 
analysis, and ―scare journalism‖ was exactly what concerned the Eisenhower 
administration.
285
 
Scientific data could be difficult for the media to present to the public in a way 
that effectively expressed uncertainty and risk when there were multiple interpretations 
of the same data. This was especially true regarding risk where the possibility of a 
negative outcome was very small. Aminotriazole contamination and testing fell into this 
category because of the contentious nature of the conclusions. The scientific fact that the 
danger was incredibly small did not reduce the anxious reactions to potential danger 
from chemical contamination.
286
 
According to the coverage, the magnitude of the cranberry problem was apparent 
to the media. During the roughly seven-week span of the cranberry scare from 
November 9 through December, 1959, newspapers referred to events as the cranberry 
crisis, the cranberry war, the cranberry problem, the cranberry cancer scare, the great 
cranberry scare and many other variants. One Northwestern newspaper quoted a 
disgusted cranberry grower referring to the scare as ―the great cranberry farce of 
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1959.‖287 Secretary Flemming referred to announcements, seizures, and procedures 
during the scare as ―actions,‖ lending his statements a more official tone.288 Cranberry 
industry references typically used terms indicative of destructive, uncontrolled forces, 
such as ―tornado‖ or ―storm.‖289 
Variations in reporting depth and differences in presentation provide important 
indicators of access to different information or different perspectives and interests. 
Cranberry growing regions publicized strong support for the cranberry industry and 
supported the farmer with risk-minimizing analysis based on medical opinion and 
experience in the field, while non-growing regions supported both industry and FDA 
perspectives with coverage of aminotriazole test results and the facts of the law. Some 
variation in the volume of regional coverage existed, but both growing and non-growing 
regions responded to the events similarly, often citing the same sources.
290
 
Media attempts to cover both sides of the issue may have resulted in more 
anxiety and a public desire to be safe rather than sorry. Using very limited source 
material, providing little historical context for a debate, and giving equal weight to 
scientists and non-scientists in reporting can generate uncertainty in the public.
291
 The 
fact that the fear generated by the scare was not confined to one area of the U.S., and the 
media coverage was similar in both growing and non-growing regions, demonstrated 
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that proximity to growing regions had no effect on the spread of concern over 
cranberries.
292
 
 
Table 5: Number of articles by topic, November through December 1959 
Number of articles 
 Science Politics/Delaney Cancer Industry Total articles 
New York Times 8 18 6 22 29 
Newark Evening 
News 
12 23 5 32 42 
Wisconsin 
Rapids Tribune 
13 25 8 24 32 
Seattle Times 6 17 7 20 24 
Growing-region 
percentage 
31% 65% 20% 85% 127 
Denver Post 5 15 4 10 17 
Houston Post 4 13 5 9 16 
San Francisco 
Chronicle 
6 14 8 10 20 
Wichita Evening 
Eagle 
2 6 3 8 10 
Non-growing 
region 
percentage 
27% 76% 32% 59% 63 
Overall 
percentage 
29% 71% 26% 72% 190 
293
 
 
Some regional differences in media coverage existed. As expected, growing 
regions dwelled on the state of the cranberry industry. References to the state of the 
cranberry industry during the scare occur in 85% of the growing-region articles as 
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compared to only 59% in non-growing regions. Newspapers in growing regions also 
showed a strong association with the cranberry industry in preference to political 
discussion. Newspapers in non-growing regions discussed FDA and USDA perspectives 
11% more and cancer issues 12% more than non-growing regions. Newspapers in 
growing and non-growing regions discussed scientific issues similarly, with an equal 
number of articles and comparable coverage of the scientific facts. The clearest 
difference in regional coverage of the scare is in overall coverage, with newspapers in 
growing regions offering twice as many articles as newspapers in growing regions (See 
Table 5). 
All of the newspapers analyzed, regardless of their association with a cranberry 
growing region, initially reported that the suspected aminotriazole contamination was 
focused in Washington and Oregon, which produced only 10% of the 1958 and 1959 
crops. At the time of Secretary Flemming‘s announcement, the FDA said it believed the 
contamination had not spread beyond that region, although other cranberry growing 
areas were being scrutinized, and that tests had not proved that aminotriazole caused 
cancer in humans.
294
 Neither of these facts appeared in the analyzed media reports. 
Flemming‘s warning, in response to an unscripted question, that housewives should not 
buy if they could not tell where the cranberries came from was, however, mentioned in 
all of the newspapers. Because there was almost no way for any individual to determine 
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the origin of specific berries, as with most produce and grain, that single statement did 
the most to set the scare in motion.
295
 
 Quotes from industry and government leaders often shaped subsequent 
commentary. Statements by George Olsson, president of Ocean Spray, and Ambrose 
Stevens, vice president and general manager of Ocean Spray that Flemming‘s ―ill-
informed and ill-advised‖ action could wipe out the industry were widely quoted.296 
Associated with many of the statements by industry leaders was the fear of massive 
financial loss to the cranberry industry.
297
 Secretary Benson said Flemming could have 
protected the public without issuing a general warning by working with the cranberry 
industry cooperatives to segregate and eliminate the contaminated berries.
298
 Oregon‘s 
Governor Meyner said ―hasty panic-button statements have sent the nation into a 
tailspin‖, and Vice President Nixon referred to the scare as hysteria.299 
 Accusations flew against Flemming in the first few days of the scare. Immediate 
calls for Flemming‘s dismissal were common both in the media and on the desks of 
prominent politicians, including Senator Kennedy and President Eisenhower. Most 
negative letters, largely written by cranberry farmers and processing executives, referred 
to Flemming‘s ―precipitous‖ statements and damage to the industry, while a group of 
positive letters, written by private citizens, lauded Flemming for his defense of public 
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health.
300
 Claims of a lack of thorough investigation and scientific support from the FDA 
were the most common negative media comments.
301
 Insistence on the harmlessness of 
aminotriazole to humans, based on the statements of FDA and American Cyanamid 
scientists, was an important thread in this attack.
302
  
Secretary Flemming was aware of the potential consequences of the timing of his 
announcement and possible damage to the cranberry industry. 
303
 Because of the specific 
timing of his announcement, allegations that Secretary Flemming chose it to hit the 
industry hardest were common. Newspapers in growing regions elaborated on the 
perception that Secretary Flemming might have intentionally chosen his timing to most 
effectively interrupt the industry‘s processing and distribution pattern and to get the most 
attention from the resulting chaos.
304
 Ocean Spray President Olssen asked the president 
to declare a disaster to get federal aid and suggested that Flemming, having made his 
first error in announcing the concern nationally, was seeking to justify his position by 
conducting a ―witch hunt‖.305 Demands for state and federal investigation, as well as 
calls for Secretary Flemming‘s resignation should no threat to public health appear, 
came from both producers and private individuals, primarily in growing regions.
306
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Flemming insisted that he acted as soon as he was certain of the problem and able to 
legally respond.
307
 
 Newspaper stories concerning local and national reactions, including lists of 
stores taking cranberry products off shelves and restaurants taking them off menus, 
appeared immediately after the initial announcement. National chains and local stores 
were affected. In the interest of public safety, state agriculture departments often sent out 
recommendations to retailers to remove cranberry products from their shelves until they 
could assure their safety.
308
 On the very first day of the scare New York, California, 
Ohio, and Michigan banned berries pending testing, and store bans were spreading 
around the nation. Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield sent an angry telegram to Secretary 
Flemming but still removed cranberries from prison menus, fearing riots.
309
 The state 
health director of California advised residents to avoid all cranberry products because no 
one could be sure they were from uncontaminated areas. Nevada echoed the sentiment, 
where the state health director urged the removal of all cranberry products from shelves 
no matter their source. Although some stores continued to stock cranberry products, 
there was very little mention of them in the media to counter the reports of bans and 
removals.
310
 
 Several days after the press conference, newspapers began reporting how several 
prominent political figures used cranberries for publicity. Vice President Nixon and 
 
307 Report, January 26, 1960 (Laguna Niguel, California), 8-10. 
308 ―Berries Off Shelves of Big A&P Chain,‖ Wisconsin Rapids Tribune, Nov. 11, 1959, p.1; ―Berry Ban Growing,‖ 
Newark Evening News, Nov. 10, 1959, p.1. 
309 ―Berries for Rocky,‖ Newark Evening News, Nov. 15, 1959, p. 6. 
310 ―Cranberry ‗Taint‘ Brings Ban in S.F.,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 11, 1959, p.1. 
  
109 
Senator John Kennedy both traveled to cranberry-growing regions and publicly 
consumed cranberry products without concern. The media both lauded and undermined 
their confidence, one even referring to them as choking down and gulping the materials 
in their attempt to support the cause.
311
  New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller was 
also watched carefully for signs of cranberry consumption.
312
 A few journalists were 
savvy enough to note that most of the avid cranberry-supporting politicians were also 
candidates for the upcoming presidential election. Kennedy and Nixon were already in 
the national spotlight, and newspapers suggested they were using the situation for 
political advantage.
313
 
 President Eisenhower‘s and Secretary Flemming‘s activities were watched by the 
media throughout the scare. The question of who would have cranberries for 
Thanksgiving or Christmas was a common editorial topic. Some reports were 
contradictory.
314
 Secretary Flemming and Secretary Benson stated that they would serve 
cleared cranberries for the holidays. There was no confirmation that Flemming did.
315
 
President Eisenhower, however, did not serve cranberries on his holiday table, settling 
for applesauce on the White House menu.
316
 
Some quoted experts claimed aminotriazole was harmless, while others claimed 
it caused cancer. Some food chains removed cranberries from their shelves, while others 
did not. A confused response from the public was a certainty when confusing and 
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contradictory information came from all sides.
317
 A November 14
th
 San Francisco 
Chronicle article proclaimed ―Plenty of Safe Cranberries Here‖ and assured readers the 
―Great Cranberry Scare‖ was over. The same article then includes a statement that FDA 
testing found two more contaminated Washington lots.
318
 A Denver Post article about 
school menus noted that all would lack cranberries for Thanksgiving except one, which 
managed to trace its berries back to the cannery. Some schools opted to keep berries off 
the menus, cleared or not, because of potential parental reaction. Another chose to use 
them, but only berries from last year‘s crop.319 
 Early in the scare, newspapers presented reactions about the scare from 
housewives and other members of the concerned public. Although intended to be 
informative, the articles presented a confusing mix of lack of concern and reactionary 
fear.
320
  Comments from people not associated with cranberries typically revolved 
around their level of fear about cancer, whereas cranberry growers were sources of 
statements concerning their economic losses. Cranberry growers were often quoted using 
terms of woe and consternation, such as ―We‘ve been crucified‖ and ―I haven‘t slept for 
days.‖321  
 Throughout the scare, all newspapers reported seizure actions by the FDA. 
Seizures of berries from both of the other growing regions which tested positive for 
aminotriazole followed the initial seizures in Washington and Oregon. Consistent denials 
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of aminotriazole‘s use in some areas, followed by seizures of lots from those areas, made 
the industry seem unaware of its own activities despite the industry‘s organized attempts 
to control and document all uses of aminotriazole on bogs. Ocean Spray and the 
processing industry countered by suggesting that berries processed in one area were 
often from a completely different growing region.
322
 
The media noted many alternatives to cranberries. Throughout the scare, media 
provided recipes, including Swedish lignonberries, sauerkraut, spiced pears and plums, 
and applesauce, that could serve as alternatives for cranberry sauce. New York 
delicatessens took the opportunity to press their less traditional wares, such as imported 
sauces and pickled fruit from Europe.
323
  Restaurants in New York and Houston offered 
alternative dishes and advertised the lack of cranberries on their menus.  Grocery store 
advertisements featured ―approved‖ relishes.324 Unfortunately, because of a dry year, 
lignonberries were not available from Europe in sufficient quantities to overcome the 
cranberry sauce shortfall.
325
 
One major regional difference in media response appeared as Thanksgiving 
approached. The newspapers from the three growing regions reported the extremely 
bleak nature of the scare for the cranberry industry and shifted their reporting to 
Christmas hopes, reflecting the hopes of the industry. Non-growing regions continued 
reporting nationwide seizures, clearings and analyses through Christmas, painting a 
 
322 ―1958 Shipment from N.J. Tainted,‖ Newark Evening News, Nov. 18, 1959, p. 9. 
323 ―Cranberry ‗Ersatz‘,‖ Newark Evening News, Nov. 10, 1959, p. 19. 
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depressing picture for the industry. Growing regions only noted seizures in their areas 
and stopped reporting bad news, taking a much more hopeful stance.
326
 
Newspapers in growing regions did the best job of presenting the cranberry 
industry‘s plight, the scientific basis of the scare, and the various events as they 
unfolded. Newspapers in both growing and non-growing regions offered detailed 
explanations of the aminotriazole situation, including substantial scientific detail and 
discussion of the Delaney ban.
327
 
The San Francisco Chronicle focused on the scientific perspectives. Dwelling on 
November press conference statements by Dr. Boyd Shafter, toxicologist for American 
Cyanamid, the article noted that the tests indicating that aminotriazole causes cancer 
were not applicable to humans. Shafter had stated that Secretary Flemming was correct 
to issue the warning under the current legislation, but that he overstated concerns over 
the toxicity of aminotriazole.
328
 A follow-up article supported Secretary Flemming and 
Commissioner Larrick and provided a good scientific analysis, stating that thyroid 
activity can be slowed by several naturally occurring chemicals, as well as several other 
chemicals currently allowed by the FDA.
329
 
Non-growing regions tended to take a more pro-FDA approach to their media 
coverage. A New York Times article reported that mail to the FDA and HEW from the 
public supported Flemming‘s actions seven to one. One anonymous writer even 
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proposed that the cranberry affair be ―blown up‖ or exposed in the media in similar 
fashion to the TV quiz show scandals, so that the intent of the FDA to protect the public 
could be more widely realized.
330
  A Wichita Evening Eagle article lauded Secretary 
Flemming for his courage in standing up to industry and other governmental agencies 
despite the damage his announcement was likely to do.
331
  A Denver Post editorial 
suggested that the cranberry alarm protected the public from a serious threat. It provided 
a balanced analysis of why the FDA did what it did and strongly criticized Secretary 
Benson for suggesting that he could have delayed the announcement until after 
Thanksgiving.
332
 
Newspapers and television helped generate the conditions for public hysteria and 
supported fears of poisoning and cancer. Many newspaper articles may have contributed 
to the hysteria by continuing to report negative or confusing results, referring to the 
situation as ―dangerous,‖ or mentioning each new ban or seizure. Their attempts to 
accurately report a complex, chaotic situation generated more chaos.
333
 Continued 
advice to the public from state and federal sources to wait for cleared lots fueled the 
panic and extended the scare through Christmas.
334
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Figure 3: Combined number of cranberry scare articles, November 1959 
 
Substantial spikes in the number of newspaper articles around November 11-12 
and November 19 showed increased media interest. The spikes corresponded to the 
initial scare reaction and the coverage surrounding the cranberry industry‘s plan to 
separate and label cleared berries. Coverage then dropped leaving minimal coverage by 
the first week of December 1959. (See Figure 3) The final financial resolution to the 
scare in May 1960 went unmentioned in most newspapers, allowing the scare to simply 
disappear from reporting. 
It is interesting to note not only what newspapers said, but what they did not say. 
The media gave little attention to or completely ignored several important factors critical 
to the scare. As expected, regional newspapers tended to choose the facts most relevant 
to their perspectives and the interests of their readers, but none told the whole story as 
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laid out by Secretary Flemming in his initial press release. The initial four page press 
release went into considerable detail on the FDA‘s motivations and the background for 
its actions. It left no doubt concerning the FDA‘s perspective and its reasoning based on 
law. Failure to report all of the supporting elements made it sound as if the FDA was 
being arbitrary in its pronouncements or blindly single-minded in its pursuit of 
aminotriazole, neither of which was the case.
335
 
Given the close association of the FDA‘s activities during the scare to protection 
of the public from cancer, it seems there would have been substantive discussion of 
cancer. However, few of the surveyed sources delved into the current understanding of 
cancer. The American public was extremely concerned with anything relating to this 
mysterious ailment, which was the second leading cause of death in the United States in 
1959. Discussion of cancer as a potential result of aminotriazole contamination or the 
current state of medicine regarding cancer was almost completely left out of cranberry 
scare commentary. Although further discussion of cancer might have added to the 
public‘s fears, it could also have soothed many minds in conjunction with scientific facts 
about the minimal risks involved with aminotriazole exposure.
336
 
Lastly, the Delaney clause itself was underreported. As the primary authority 
supporting the FDA‘s actions during the scare and as legislation intended to protect the 
public from harm, it seems that the Delaney clause would have been a main topic of 
discussion. Although most of the surveyed sources mentioned that the Delaney clause 
 
335 Statement by Arthur S. Flemming, November 9, 1959 (Abilene, Kansas), 1-4. 
336 Freudenburg and Pastor, "Public Responses to Technological Risks: Toward a Sociological Perspective," 403-4. 
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banned cancer-causing substances in food and that it was the source of the FDA action, 
very few reported exactly what the clause meant or on the medical and testing science 
that gave it support. The November 9
th
 press release explained the clause well, and both 
the FDA and Ocean Spray offered further commentary in the following days.
337
 Without 
an understanding of the scientific background of the clause and its relevance to 
aminotriazole testing, the public had to assume that the FDA used the clause only to 
protect against imminently harmful threats.
338
 
All of these elements might have helped the public better understand the issues 
and reduced the fear reaction. However, inclusion of extensive scientific, medical, and 
legal data could also have made the media reports tedious and uninteresting, resulting in 
more confusion. 
 
Magazine coverage 
A brief survey of nationally distributed periodicals was done to determine how 
broad the coverage of the cranberry scare had been. Periodicals that ran articles on the 
scare reported information similar to newspaper sources, although they condensed 
coverage. Weekly news serials, such as Time and U.S. News and World Report, featured 
small articles on the scare through early 1960. There were no articles on the topic in Life, 
Good Housekeeping, Saturday Evening Post, Ladies Home Journal, Harper’s, or New 
Yorker. Either the cranberry scare was simply too short in duration to have any 
 
337 Ocean Spray Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 10, 1959 (Wisconsin State Cranberry Growers Association 
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meaningful impact on the monthlies, or it was not interesting to the editors of those 
magazines. Spreading sensational news might sell magazines, but it might also turn 
away some readers by association with unpleasant news. Some of the periodicals may 
also have required too much lead time before layout and publication, by which time the 
scare was no longer news.
339
 Most of the above magazines featured cranberry recipes 
and traditional photos of holiday feasting in their holiday issues, and none referenced 
alternatives or concerns over aminotriazole or cancer. 
 
Political responses 
More than a decade of concern over the issue of adulteration in foods and the 
potential public response preceded the political response to the scare.  Public forums on 
the topic included the Chemicals in Food Products hearings in 1950-1951 and 1956, the 
Health Inquiry hearings in 1953, and several other hearings and legislative actions on 
chemicals and their management.
340
 
Before 1959, the White House, FDA, and USDA were already concerned with 
potential problems about revelations of chemical contamination in the media. White 
House staff members were concerned with the potential for scare journalism and 
negative public reaction, and were discussing ways to deal with problems when they 
occurred. However, there was no evidence that preparations went beyond the planning 
stage before Secretary Flemming‘s November 9 press conference. The majority of the 
 
339 Ibid, 25-27. 
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pre-scare discussions centered on DDT in milk and diethylstilbesterol hormone residues 
in poultry, both of which the FDA later banned under the Delaney clause.
341
  
A confidential memorandum in January 1959 laid out several key concerns about 
the ―residue problem‖ and includes two points that closely mirrored events during the 
cranberry scare 8 months later. Point 3: ―widespread disregard by users of the 
manufacturer‘s instructions for the use of these materials, which contributes importantly 
to the residue problem‖, and point 6: ―The risk of disruption of agriculture and the food 
industries if the recognized health hazard gets blown out of proportion by ‗scare 
journalism‘ before sound answers from all points of view can be found‖. Point 3 was the 
ultimate cause of the FDA‘s actions in November 1959, and point 6 was the result of 
those actions.
342
 
The memo included by six pages of detailed discussion concerning residues of 
the insecticide DDT in meat and milk. The discussion covered all of the major problems 
encountered later in the cranberry scare, including dependence on the problem chemical, 
ill-advised use of the chemical, and testing for extremely small residues. The jurisdiction 
overlap between the USDA and FDA when they disagreed on such problems was also a 
point of concern. The document did not suggest any immediate courses of action other 
than that the meat industry has ―to live on pins and needles for the time being.‖ The 
other points in the list represented pesticide residue concerns that did not become critical 
 
341 ―Some Suggestions for Overcoming the Problem of Undesirable residues in Agricultural Products, Especially Meat 
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themes during the cranberry scare, such as the dependence of agriculture on chemicals 
and the research and development time required to find alternative chemicals.
343
 
A follow-up memo to Don Paarlberg, Agricultural Economics Advisor to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, discussed the developing problem of undesirable residues in 
agricultural products. It mentioned the critical importance of chemicals in modern 
agriculture and cited increasing difficulty in avoiding residues. It also suggested that 
finding ways to completely avoid residues would have involved a great deal more 
funding as well as substantial time. The USDA had already made some advances in 
developing effective chemicals that left little or no residues, but progress was slow.
344
 
In another memo from John Harvey, Deputy HEW Commissioner, one month 
before the scare, Harvey responded to a request from Paarlberg that all agencies 
involved in the regulation of chemicals and food prepare a press statement ―in case a 
major public concern develops about the safety of foods that contain residues of 
pesticide chemicals.‖ The attached FDA statement was similar to parts of Secretary 
Flemming‘s November 9 press release, especially the sections discussing residue 
tolerances, the Food Additive Amendment provisions, and assurances of the safety of the 
food supply.
345
 
Although the President Eisenhower was aware of the cranberry problem and 
attended meetings to discuss departmental disagreements between USDA and FDA, he 
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avoided direct involvement. The President called Secretary Flemming on November 14 
to ask him to assemble a panel of doctors to professionally advise on the cancer situation 
and to keep his staff informed.
346
 In a 1988 interview, Secretary Flemming noted that he 
experienced no significant pressure from the White House to take any particular course 
during the scare.
347
 However, the concern and fear drew President Eisenhower‘s 
attention, and he felt caught in the middle of a bureaucratic tangle between the USDA 
and the FDA. George Kistiakowski, the President‘s Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology from 1957-61, was explicitly told to handle the matter when the president 
became frustrated at being ―pushed from two sides.‖ Kistiakowski led the efforts to 
coordinate White House policy with USDA and HEW. He met with all of the groups 
involved, provided the expertise of the Science Advisory Committee, and kept the 
President informed of developments.
348
 
As a result of the lack of communication and liaison between the HEW and 
USDA during the scare, the White House created a committee, headed by Dr. 
Kistiakowski, to improve communications between the government and food industry as 
well as between government departments.
349
 Although informal connections already 
existed between the HEW and USDA to share technical information about chemicals, 
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pests, and human nutrition, the scare and the increasing complexity of chemical concerns 
created interest in developing more formal relationships.
350
 
Vice President Nixon and Senator John Kennedy (D-Mass) both played 
supportive roles during the cranberry scare, and generally placed their support with the 
cranberry industry. A question that appeared repeatedly in the media, concerned whether 
their actions expressed support for the industry and public health or indicated shrewd 
political maneuvering. Both men knew voters concerned about chemicals in food could 
potentially sway the upcoming presidential elections. 
Both Nixon and Kennedy were well informed during the scare and had copies of 
Secretary Flemming‘s original press release in their files. Both men received letters from 
cranberry farmers and industry officials that referred to Flemming‘s statements as 
needless, drastic, ill-timed, poorly considered, inaccurate, and many other less 
complimentary terms. As a senator from the most productive cranberry state, Kennedy‘s 
papers focused on the industry, the needs of farmers, and seeking legislative and 
financial resolution to the crisis.
351
 
Nixon participated in several staff and cabinet meetings about the scare. Nixon 
also stated to the press that the public hysteria was unwarranted.
352
 Nixon‘s files, titled 
―Cranberry Flap‖, contained a wide variety of information on the scare, including 
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articles, a series of official HEW press releases through 1960, the transcript of the 
November 18
th
 meeting of Secretary Flemming and Commissioner Larrick with 
representatives of the cranberry industry, and the subsequent press release on November 
19. Nixon received dozens of letters expressing concern after he ate cranberries in 
Wisconsin on November 10. His formal response to those concerns noted that the event 
coordinators did not know at the time whether the berries were tainted. Several citizens 
condemned him for political posturing at the expense of the cranberry industry. In letters 
responding to concerns over his health, Nixon said that distortions of Secretary 
Flemming‘s statements by the press had fueled the hysteria.353 
 Senator Kennedy, a likely candidate in the upcoming presidential election 
competing with an incumbent Vice President, had a similar desire to win public support 
and show his interest in protecting the public health. Kennedy supported the cranberry 
industry in his home state. His participation in cranberry-related events gave him 
widespread publicity and drew praise from the public in all of the growing regions, 
especially in his home state of Massachusetts. Kennedy appealed to the USDA and 
Congress for administrative aid for the stricken cranberry industry during the scare.
354
 
Kennedy maintained files, titled ―Cranberry Industry‖, containing a series of 
letters about potential legislation and aid from both state and federal sources, as well as 
notes thanking Kennedy for his words and help during the crisis. One letter from Chester 
E. Cross, Head of the University of Massachusetts Cranberry Experiment Station, 
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accused the FDA of focusing tests on known contaminated crops and thanked Kennedy 
for supporting the cranberry industry against ―arbitrary‖ and ―outrageous‖ government 
action.
355
 Kennedy was very well informed about both the background of aminotriazole 
as well as on communication between the USDA and HEW. He communicated directly 
with George Olsson of Ocean Spray, scientists and academics, and officials at American 
Cyanamid, as well as Secretary Flemming.
356
 
More important than the political appearances and public attention, the effects of 
the cranberry scare dovetailed perfectly with existing efforts to amend the Agriculture 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. Both federal and state marketing orders were 
designed to give cranberry growers and cooperatives more ability to control the market 
for their products and to help prevent price fluctuations and speculation that might hurt 
the industry. As early as 1956, Senator Kennedy had led efforts to pass a Massachusetts 
state marketing order to deal with increasing volumes of frozen berries, and he was one 
of the primary proponents of a national cranberry marketing order.
357
 The cranberry 
growers and cooperatives consistently supported the legislation because price supports 
and government control would help prevent fluctuations in price. Processors and 
distributors resisted because the same supports and controls would remove some of the 
market competition that allowed them to speculate and profit from the farmers and 
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cooperatives.
358
 The events of the cranberry scare and their damaging effects on all 
segments of the industry reduced resistance and permitted passage of the amendment to 
allow marketing orders for cranberries. President Kennedy‘s support from the White 
House was invaluable in the passage of the Agricultural Enabling Amendments Act on 
August 8, 1961.
359
 
 Many state departments of agriculture and health immediately disseminated 
information and tested cranberries in their regions. Cranberry growing states were more 
involved in the testing process than non-cranberry growing regions.
360
 Washington, as a 
growing region and one of the states implicated in the initial scare seizures, was very 
active. Governor Albert Rosellini took a stance immediately after the November 9 press 
release, requesting action from his Congressional representatives to protect the growers 
in his state and to find out what happened.
361
 Joe Dwyer, Director of the Washington 
State Department of Agriculture, wrote to Governor Rosellini that a full investigation 
would be necessary to restore public confidence in the food supply. He also noted that 
neither the FDA nor the USDA had issued warning to his department before Flemming‘s 
announcement. He suggested that had his department sufficient time, it could have 
avoided emergency testing costs and even developed a plan to avoid the scare.
362
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 In a telegram to Senator Warren Magnusson (D-Wash), Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Governor Rosellini emphasized the 
need for better communication between the USDA and HEW, as well as between the 
federal organizations and state departments of health.
363
 He noted in a press release on 
November 23
rd
 that the consumer could buy labeled products with confidence. 
Unfortunately, on November 24
th
 he reported that, although labeling was no longer 
necessary for processed cranberry products, fresh berries were still suspect and that 
consumers should purchase only labeled products, both canned and fresh, undermining 
his previous statement of confidence.
364
 Congressman Jamie Whitten (D-Miss), 
Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee for Agriculture, suggested that the whole 
cranberry affair was a political appeal by the ―overzealous and politically ambitious‖ to 
the 88% non-farmer percentage of the American voting public.
365
 
 
Secretary Flemming and the scare 
 The perspectives of the FDA and Secretary Flemming were clear and consistent 
throughout the scare. The Delaney clause stated that cancer-causing materials must not 
be components of food, no matter their source or concentration. The FDA determined 
that aminotriazole caused cancer in laboratory animals and had been found on some 
cranberry crops. It was the responsibility of the FDA to protect public health by 
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preventing contaminated products from reaching the consumer, and Secretary Flemming 
was following the letter of the law. 
A pivotal question was whether concern for the public was Secretary Flemming‘s 
primary motivation, or whether there was there more to the story. As the Secretary of 
HEW, battling adulteration of foods was one of Flemming‘s primary duties. During the 
scare, some newspapers portrayed Secretary Flemming as a hero who saved the public 
from cancer.
366
  This effect had the potential to boost his political career. However, at 
least one Wisconsin reporter suggested that his ―vicious attack‖ on the cranberry 
industry was part of a plan to punish the industry and gain from the publicity.
367
 His 
actions during the cranberry scare were intended to affect both the industry and the 
public, although the scale of the impact was underestimated. Secretary Flemming denied 
any intentional desire to harm the cranberry industry or to reap political benefits from 
the controversy, stating that he had very little time to actually prepare his statements.
368
 
The 1960 HEW Annual Report suggested that the FDA‘s timing of the November 9 
announcement was based on the development of a method to detect aminotriazole 
residues, which was made available in October 1959.
369
 The timing just before harvest, 
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Flemming‘s refusal to negotiate with the industry, and his foreknowledge of the possible 
consequences caused some members of the cranberry community to doubt that claim.
370
 
Some criticisms of Secretary Flemming claimed he was under-qualified for his 
post.
371
 Flemming had taken his HEW post in 1958 after several previous postings, 
including the U.S. Civil Service Commission from 1939-1948 under President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, the Hoover Commission (as Civil Service Commissioner) in 1947 under 
President Harry S. Truman, Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
from 1951-1953 under Truman, and Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from 
1954-1957 under Eisenhower. As Secretary of HEW, he interacted frequently with the 
media, especially television and radio, in distributing official information, and the scare 
was no exception. His well-prepared bi-monthly press conferences were well attended 
by the media, giving Secretary Flemming ample opportunity to use publicity and the 
media to achieve his institutional goals. His frequent press conferences were a major 
change from his predecessors, who met with the press only when necessary.
372
 
A Wichita Evening Eagle article suggested that the public response might have 
been more extreme than Secretary Flemming expected. Secretary Flemming was 
criticized for his failure to foresee the consequences of his announcements, and 
cranberry industry officials accused him in the media of making the situation worse in 
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his attempts to justify the action.
373
 Unfortunately, retracting the initial statement was 
both impossible and unlikely to help once the fears of the public were aroused.
374
 
Injunctions, seizures, and adverse publicity were the three main tools available to 
the FDA in dealing with adulterated foods when warnings and non-punitive measures 
had failed.
375
 Secretary Flemming‘s tools of choice in November of 1959 were seizure 
and adverse publicity.
376
 Injunctions proved unnecessary, as the cranberry industry 
cooperated with the administration fully from the beginning in 1957. Seizures of both 
tainted and untainted berries in 1957 resulted in the destruction of several million pounds 
of fruit. Continued seizures throughout 1959 accompanied by press releases and progress 
reports, kept the topic in the media and the public‘s eye.377 
Publicity can be powerful, and there is a long history of government using it to 
advantage.
378
 The use of adverse publicity by the FDA and the HEW to pressure the 
cranberry and chemical industries was a central theme in the cranberry scare. 
Educational programs and large-scale seizures in 1957 had failed to stop improper use of 
aminotriazole. Secretary Flemming considered the publicity necessary to protect the 
public despite the possible consequences to the industry. He refused attempts by Ocean 
Spray officials to arbitrate the situation in private before the press conference, and he did 
not allow Secretary Benson access to the press release until the conference had begun 
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because Flemming had not approved the content until just beforehand.
379
 The timing of 
the publicity was intended to not only warn the public of what the FDA considered a 
potential danger to public health, but also to force stricter compliance by the cranberry 
industry with the Food and Drug Act and Delaney clause.
380
 
The question raised by the cranberry industry most often in 1959 was the 
necessity of the publicity. The industry had made several efforts to work with the FDA 
and to curtail improper use of aminotriazole. Offers were on the table to continue 
destroying large portions of the annual crop until the two sides solved the problem. 
Secretary Flemming‘s urgency was based in past failures to solve the aminotriazole 
residue problem, and protection of the public from uncertain danger, as well as the letter 
of the law.
381
 Secretary Flemming did not trust that the tainted berries would not find 
their way to market, and the law obligated him to prevent such contamination of the food 
supply. Cranberry and chemical industry concerns were secondary to protection of the 
public health.
382
 
Some sources took a less critical view of Secretary Flemming and his actions. A 
November 24
th
 Wichita Evening Eagle article, focusing on Secretary Flemming, was 
titled ―Cranberry Courage.‖ The media styled Secretary Flemming as a ―realistic,‖ ―hard 
minded,‖ ―cranberry alarm-giver‖. The article supports Flemming for standing firm in 
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his protection of the public from harm despite the USDA‘s, the industry‘s and some 
segments of the public‘s attacks. The article also noted that he was simultaneously 
taking aim at diploma mills, championing fluoridation, and working on a medical pact 
with the Russians on cancer research, in addition to battling chemical adulteration of the 
food supply. He was characterized as a career administrator who had not yet reached the 
top of his career. The article also noted that secretary of HEW was a perfect post for 
building a public reputation because of the potential for visibility.
383
  
Despite the industry accusations and media coverage, no evidence indicated that 
Secretary Flemming ever wavered in his intent during the scare. He was consistent in his 
support of the letter of the Delaney clause, and he pressed the issue to a conclusion that 
satisfied the law. His original press release from November 9
th
 covered all the scientific 
bases, and it was clear and non-judgmental of the industry. Secretary Flemming‘s 
actions were both ethical and legal, even though he knew there might be serious 
repercussions for the industry.
384
 In a 1967 letter discussing the scare, he stated ―If 
confronted with the same set of circumstances again I would act in a similar manner.‖385 
The cranberry scare was the first test of the Delaney clause, as well as a 
demonstration of the need for such a procedure in defense of health. Although scientists 
did not agree on the technical necessity of the clause to defend against cancer, the 
public‘s response to the mention of cancer made it clear there was good reason to take 
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action. The debate over whether the Delaney clause served a scientifically valid purpose 
continued for decades, but the media made it clear that the FDA‘s attempt to protect the 
public was appreciated.
386
 Other cancer scare announcements based on the Delaney 
clause followed the cranberry scare. They included announcements of residues of 
diethylstilbesterol in animals and animal products, coal tar dyes in cosmetics, and alar 
residues on apples.  These actions were in direct response to the Delaney clause as well 
as the 1960 Color Additives Amendment, which also contained Delaney-like clauses.
387
 
 
Industry responses 
 Initial responses from the cranberry industry to the November 9
th
 announcement 
took the form of shock and outrage. The industry contended that Flemming‘s statements 
came with minimal warning, and without the opportunity to collaborate on a non-
damaging settlement.
388
 There had been warnings of problems with aminotriazole, 
despite industry protestations of surprise. Cranberry and chemical industry documents 
from before the scare expressed grim expectation of problems resulting from the failure 
to set a tolerance on aminotriazole residues. Growers and processors feared the worst if 
aminotriazole was not registered with a residue tolerance.
389
 A detailed November 6 
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press release from American Cyanamid showed that the chemical industry anticipated 
the potential problem with aminotriazole.
390
 
The industry never claimed it did not understand why Secretary Flemming made 
the announcement. The main contention was that his action penalized the entire 
cranberry and chemical industries for the actions of a relatively few growers.
391
  The 
cranberry industry was already working with the FDA and USDA to solve the problem, 
with a willingness to do what was necessary to solve it. Growers were warned not to use 
aminotriazole for any reason in September, 1959. Millions of pounds of suspect berries 
were already set aside for testing. The cranberry industry‘s perspective was that there 
simply was never a reason for a public announcement, and that the problem should have 
been handled internally.  The FDA countered by pointing out that the September 
warning was too late to have protected the 1959 crop from misused aminotriazole. The 
1959 cranberries could have been contaminated before the ban went into effect, 
requiring the announcement to protect the public from contaminated berries already on 
the market.
392
 Nonetheless, contamination statistics from 1957 and 1959 showed that 
industry education efforts and the ban on aminotriazole might have been successful after 
all. 
Throughout the scare, the chemical and cranberry industries consistently denied 
any potential harm to the public. They both presented substantial data indicating the 
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unsoundness of the scientific basis for considering aminotriazole carcinogenic. Although 
their scientific point of view was well supported by research and professional opinion, 
conflict with the inflexible nature of the Delaney clause was a losing battle for scientific 
logic and reasoned analysis of chemical toxicity.
393
 
The cranberry and chemical industries cooperated with the FDA and USDA 
without hesitation. From the beginnings of the crisis in the 1957 season through the 
scare, the presentation of the industry‘s labeling plan, nationwide testing, and eventual 
government compensation, the industries cooperated fully.
394
 After protests and 
negotiations failed, the only option was to work within FDA guidelines and to work with 
Secretary Flemming for the best result possible. 
 The events of the scare forced major changes in the cranberry production base 
almost overnight. The scare was particularly devastating financially. Cranberry 
producers were already dealing with several consecutive years of marginal profitability 
because of crop carryovers. The remainder of the held 1957 crop and an indeterminate 
percentage of the 1958 crop remained permanently unsold and wasted. Producers and 
processors had to push marketing and product development efforts faster than they 
planned.
395
 The industry embarked on a full marketing, advertising, and production 
campaign to use the ever-increasing volumes of berries more effectively by inspiring the 
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public to use them throughout the year.
396
 Examples of new products included dried 
sweetened cranberries, cranberry juice mixes, cranberry salsa, candied cranberries, and 
inclusion of cranberries in trail mixes.  
The Market Research Corporation compared sales from November 8 through 28, 
1959, to the same period in 1958. Sales of manufactured cranberry products fell 66% 
over the three-week span, and sales of fresh berries dropped an average of 73%. Hopes 
for Christmas sales did not materialize, and the ―devastating losses‖ continued through 
the end of the year.
397
 Ocean Spray commissioned a one-time study to assess some of the 
effects of the scare on the cranberry market. ―Trendex‖ survey data, reported on 
December 21, 1959, noted ―permanent‖ damage to the industry and to public confidence 
in cranberries. Fifty one percent of respondents did not serve cranberries for their 1959 
Thanksgiving dinners. Of that 51%, 91% had served cranberries in previous years. Of 
the 91% who previously served cranberries, 55% specifically mentioned the cancer scare 
as the reason they did not do so in 1959. Of the group that did not serve cranberries 
berries in 1959, 47% said they would never serve cranberries again, resulting in an 
apparent permanent 11% reduction in that market.
398
 Fortunately for the cranberry 
industry, this prediction of doom did not materialize. Sales in the 1960 and 1961 seasons 
were still down, but much closer to expected levels and increasing steadily.
399
 1962 was 
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the first year in which a cranberry marketing order took effect, changing the pattern of 
distribution and sales drastically.
400
 
One of the cranberry industry‘s major complaints was that the FDA provided no 
financial support to back up its testing requirements. The loss of crops was devastating 
enough without having to pay for expensive testing and long term storage of unsold 
crops as well. The industry needed more direct help to sell its product and to make room 
to store the 1960 crop. Federal loans became available for relief soon after the scare 
began, but more debt was not what the cranberry industry needed.
401
 Federal purchase of 
excess fruit, an alternative to loans, quickly became the approach industry supporters 
favored.
402
 
The primary solution was direct federal funding under ―section 32‖ of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935. The Secretary of Agriculture authorized the funds 
for encouraging the exportation of agricultural products, encouraging the domestic 
consumption of agricultural commodities and reestablishing farmer purchasing power by 
making payments on agricultural commodities. The Secretary had complete authority to 
define how and why his use of the funds fit the expenditure categories. Agricultural 
products purchased with section 32 funds were to be ―donated for relief purposes‖ or to 
support summer camps for children.
403
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In February 1960, USDA Secretary Benson summarized the funding issue in a 
letter to General Wilton Persons, White House Chief of Staff. Benson acknowledged the 
authority to use section 32 funds but stated that such payments would require a major 
departure from existing policy and that there would be no way for the existing 
organizations to use the unsold berries. He expressed concern that invoking the 
―questionable provision‖ might result in a flood of similar requests from groups in 
distress, and he suggested that loans through the Commodity Credit Corporation would 
be a better choice.
404
 
Senator Hastings Keith (R-Mass) discussed the price support idea in a letter 
summarizing a meeting with Gerald Morgan, Deputy Assistant to the President. Keith 
stated that ―everyone agreed that a moral obligation exists to provide assistance to the 
growers.‖ During the meeting, Don Paarlberg, Agricultural Economics Advisor to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, confirmed that legal authority to act existed. Keith supported 
the use of section 32 funds to help the cranberry industry and to avoid the necessity of 
introducing special funding legislation which might have ―disastrous results.‖ Keith was 
concerned that the longer the Eisenhower Administration waited to deal with the 
cranberry issue, the less sympathetic Congress would become, and the more political any 
action might appear.
405
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A similar letter from Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass) to Bryce Harlow, 
Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Affairs, encouraged use of the price 
support program to avoid the necessity of introducing new legislation to solve the 
problem. Saltonstall claimed that follow-up tests for aminotriazole done by the cranberry 
industry found no contamination, contradicting specific FDA findings. He suggested that 
that fact alone could cause the administration great difficulty. 
406
 Senator Saltonstall also 
wrote to USDA Secretary Benson,  
A very few growers, to whose action the Government reacted precipitously, 
have placed the entire industry in jeopardy. We must continue to protect the 
public, as your Department has done so skillfully, from disease, but if all 
protection were rendered in the fashion in which it has been rendered on 
cranberries, I believe we could both visualize the public eating nothing but 
cereal, and worrying about that. 
407
  
 
Both Keith and Saltonstall considered the damage done to the cranberry industry 
through ―precipitous action‖ of the government a serious political mistake, which 
providing relief to the cranberry industry would help alleviate. Another letter from 
Senator Keith to Gerald Morgan listed several advantages to providing relief, including 
―prevent giving political initiative and ammunition to our opposition‖, ―avoid providing 
a sounding board for attacks against Flemming, Benson, or the Administration‖, 
―eliminate the possibility of a further rift between two executive departments‖ and 
―avoid the establishment of a legislative precedent.‖ The last point on the list was to 
―leave all of us in the best possible position with both the cranberry growers and the 
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public.‖408 Pressure from people like Saltonstall and Keith helped persuade Secretary 
Benson to use section 32 funds to support the cranberry industry. 
The Cranberry Payment Program, authorized on May 4, 1960, was not a price 
support program, but a buyout. Secretary of Agriculture Benson used section 32 funds to 
purchase unsold cranberries. Producers were required to submit a complex array of 
applications, supporting documents, and signatures from both farmers and cooperative 
managers to receive payments only for ―wholesome and marketable‖ berries from the 
1959 season, screened and free of aminotriazole contamination. The cranberry payment 
program paid $8.02 per barrel, compared with an estimated market price of over $12.00 
per barrel had the scare not occurred. 
409
 Although the solution was not unique, because 
the USDA had bought out small stocks of cranberries with section 32 funds in 1950 and 
1954, it was certainly unusual in its scope. The combination of the 1950 and 1954 
purchases cost $2.5 million.
410
 The 1959 buyout of 1.1 million barrels of cranberries, 
which were used for federal food programs, given to charities and used for cattle feed, 
cost an estimated $9 million.
411
 
 The scare had minimal effect on the chemical industry during and after the scare. 
A general ban on aminotriazole issued by the FDA followed the scare, and the 
manufacturers removed the chemical from the market in 1961. Although the 
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manufacturers and distributors lost a source of revenue, the relative financial loss was 
minute and alternative chemicals emerged. The chemical industry was very involved in 
the political defense of chemicals and the cranberry industry. Amchem and American 
Cyanamid provided scientific statements concerning the aminotriazole toxicity studies 
and their relationship to human biology.
412
 
The combination of reports and responses from the media, the cranberry and 
chemical industries, and official sources created a complex web of information. 
Throughout the scare, the facts of the situation, the perspectives of the FDA and the 
cranberry industry, and the philosophy behind the relevant legislation were available to 
the press. The choices each source and group made in disseminating certain information 
shaped the course of the scare by influencing the public‘s perceptions. The public was 
concerned about the apparent threat and confused by inconsistent information from the 
media. Conflicting opinions and scientific interpretations from the cranberry industry 
and the FDA undermined public confidence. Fear was a natural result.
413
 
 Press coverage over time and the response of the public provided evidence of the 
interest in and concern over the topic. Initial reactions were often characterized by shock 
and panicked reaction.
414
 The passage through the processes of testing, labeling, and 
clearance of enough berries for Thanksgiving and Christmas was well covered in all 
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regions, but articles moved progressively farther from the front page.
415
 By the end of 
the scare around Christmas 1959, most papers had ceased to report on the scare, and it 
did not make the majority of nationally distributed magazines in any detail. 
 The cranberry scare inspired prophetic thoughts concerning the shape of things to 
come. Dr. William Thompson, director of chemistry and chemical engineering at the 
Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, Texas stated during the scare that the 
events of 1959 ―may be just a small forerunner of many food bans and investigations.‖416 
One forward-looking Houston Post article opined that there would definitely be more 
conflicts concerning rigid chemical laws and foresaw the pending color additives 
amendment as another source of future scares.
417
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION - EPILOGUE 
Once the words left Secretary Flemming‘s mouth, the events of the cranberry 
scare were set in motion. Whether he intended the storm it generated, the public was 
primed to react, and react it did. Despite its brief duration, the scare reshaped the 
cranberry industry in the short term as well as the long term, and it set the stage for 
similar events revolving around cancer and the Delaney clause. 
Despite the partial preparedness of the Eisenhower administration and the many 
accusations cast at Secretary Flemming, the blame ultimately rested with the cranberry 
farmers.
418
 A Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce looked into the scare in 1960. Congressional 
investigators concluded that ―growers had taken a calculated risk in using (the) 
aminotriazole, and had lost.‖419 
Limited economic impact across the nation was a likely cause for the cranberry 
industry‘s inability to rally enough public and administrative support in the face of the 
Delaney clause to prevent the scare. The short term effects of the cranberry scare 
extended until 1962, when the price per barrel returned to pre-1959 levels. The loss of 
the 1959 Thanksgiving and Christmas markets depressed the industry and crop values 
for several years, but it did not have any substantive effect on production. Subsequent 
crops continued to generate carryovers, with an average carryover of 150,000 barrels in 
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1960 and 1961, underscoring the need for better marketing to increase demand and a 
need for more products to consume surplus berries.
420
 
Immediately following the scare, the Eisenhower administration sought to 
address growing concern over chemicals in food and their regulation. A January 20, 
1960 cabinet report, ―Chemicals and Food,‖ focused on the differences in the statutory 
responsibilities of the USDA and the HEW, as well as the enforcement burdens 
generated by the Delaney clause and zero tolerance chemicals. The report concluded that 
the USDA and HEW needed to establish liaison arrangements between departments, as 
well as among state, local and commercial entities. The report also recommended that 
the HEW and USDA submit proposals for improved enforcement of regulations and that 
both departments study how to best coordinate their efforts. The final recommendation 
was that HEW and USDA support a change in the law to allow carcinogen residues in 
animal feed as long as no residues or carcinogenic byproducts remained in the animal 
products when shipped to market.
421
 Secretary Benson‘s official response to the report 
concurred with its findings. He emphasized several times in his press release that users 
of chemicals needed to follow directions on the approved labels.
422
 The recommendation 
to alter the Delaney clause to permit residues in animal feeds was supported in the 
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passage of the 1960 Color Additives Amendment, but it was not added to the law until 
the Drug Industry Act of 1962.
423
 
The Chemicals Panel on Carcinogenic Food Additives, a section of the 
President‘s Science Advisory Committee, studied the industry‘s concerns from January 
through May 1960 and offered suggestions to support public confidence, improve 
administration of the Food and Drug Act, and help prevent disturbance of the food 
supply. The panel consisted of nine eminent scientists, including Dr. Detlev Bronk, 
chairman, president of the Rockefeller Institute and president of the National Academy 
of Sciences, Dr. Alfred Gellhorn, director of the Institute of Cancer Research and 
professor of Medicine at Columbia University, and Dr. James Horsfall, Director of the 
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station. The Panel‘s assessment supported the 
purpose of the Delaney clause while acknowledging that minute quantities of 
carcinogenic materials might not have negative effects in humans. The panel concluded 
that application of the Delaney clause required scientific judgment and discretion in its 
interpretation, noting the large number of variables involved in determining 
carcinogenicity.
424
 
The panel suggested that the Secretary of HEW appoint an advisory board to help 
him properly evaluate scientific evidence in cases where sanctions were under 
consideration. The board would consist of FDA, USDA, and National Cancer Institute 
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scientists, as well as outside scientists nominated by the National Academy of Sciences. 
The panel suggested that if existing legislation did not provide the means for the 
Secretary of HEW to exercise the proper discretion, then new legislation should be 
sought. It also recommended placing greater emphasis on studies to determine the best 
means of extrapolating data from test animals to humans and that the USDA expand its 
research programs to find alternative materials and processing methods.
425
 
George Kistiakowski endorsed the panel‘s findings for the Science Advisory 
Committee and a summarized the panel‘s findings to the President. Kistiakowski noted 
that the President was eager for the Science Advisory Committee to determine whether 
the USDA was doing too little, too much, or just enough research, especially regarding 
how much money was being spent on the issue. Secretary Benson agreed with the 
report‘s findings and recommended that the report be made public, while Secretary 
Flemming opposed publication because some elements of the report did not fit FDA 
interpretation of the law.
426
 The central significance of the document was that it outlined 
the regulatory and scientific difficulties inherent in the Delaney clause and suggested 
repealing it in favor of applying scientific discretion, which happened 36 years later. 
Although I found no evidence that the panel‘s findings were published as written, the 
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interpretations and conclusions from the May 1960 report became part of a report by the 
Food Protection Committee of the National Research Council in December.
427
  
The cranberry scare was both public and expensive for the Eisenhower 
administration. Secretary Flemming‘s uncompromising support of the law put the health 
and safety of the American public before economics and the concerns of industry, but his 
actions resulted in substantial negative publicity and millions of federal dollars spent.
428
 
Flemming had a distinguished post-scare career, although there was no sign of aspiration 
to the presidency. Stepping away from his government roles for a period, Flemming 
served as the president of the University of Oregon from 1961 to 1968. In 1971, 
President Nixon appointed him U.S. Commissioner on Aging, and he served on the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights from 1974 to 1981. He was an advisor to President Clinton 
on aging and received his second Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1994 for his service 
to the nation. The first had been awarded by President Eisenhower in 1957.
429
 
Congressman Delaney continued lobbying for food safety legislation and resisted efforts 
to ―nibble away‖ at the Delaney clause.430 He had a strong presence in shaping the Color 
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Additives Amendment of 1960 and subsequent legislation to amend the Food and Drug 
Act until his retirement from public service in 1978.
431
 
The cranberry industry viewed the cranberry payment program as the final 
resolution to the scare. The 1959 season was over, the industry had avoided complete 
financial collapse, and it could move forward. The administration took some 
responsibility for the industry‘s loss and tried to alleviate some of the financial loss in 
the lost 1959 crop.
432
 An increase in government allocation of cranberries to soldiers 
around the world helped distribute the purchased 1959 berries before the 1960 season 
created new surpluses.
433
 
The 1961 Agricultural Act amended the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
of 1937 (AMAA) to include cranberries, cherries and apples. The AMAA permitted the 
Secretary of Agriculture to regulate commodities markets if approved by a majority of 
the producers and processors. The amendment extended the power of the Secretary of 
Agriculture to set price controls to the end of any annual marketing season so that the 
commodity market could avoid disruption of the marketing of any commodity.
434
 The 
Cranberry Marketing Committee (CMC), first activated in 1962 by USDA Secretary 
Orville Freeman, managed production volume, distribution, marketing and promotion 
for cranberries throughout the US to maintain a stable and profitable market. Annual 
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carryovers were managed by fixing market prices and creating a stable demand 
throughout the year, preventing buildup and ensuring the sale and distribution of the 
crop before the next year‘s harvest.435 
The CMC used two regulation programs to adjust the volume of cranberries 
available to meet market demand. First, a withholding program provided ―free‖ and 
―restricted‖ percentages of the annual cranberry crop that producers could place on the 
market. The percentages, determined by the CMC on an annual basis, applied to all 
producers equally. The CMC used withholding programs in 1962, 1963, 1970, and 1971. 
The CMC added a second volume regulation method to its arsenal, a producer allotment 
program, in 1968. Producer allotment programs provided individual producers with 
percentages of their crop based upon an average of the previous few years. The 
percentages determined how much they could produce and market in that year. Both 
volume regulation methods allowed for marketing of free berries to any commercial 
market but restricted berries had to be distributed to non-competitive outlets, such as 
charities, research, development projects, non-human food uses and international outlets 
other than Canada. Producer allotments were far more flexible and better served the 
needs of the CMC.
436
 
A 1969 study compared weekly household consumption of cranberries before, 
during, and after the scare. Three hundred families in Atlanta, Georgia, were the 
admittedly limited subject pool. The study determined that, although per capita 
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consumption of cranberries dropped 26 percent in 1959, local consumption levels 
returned to pre-scare levels immediately in 1960. The study concluded that the scare had 
no significant effect on demand for cranberries in the Atlanta region and suggested that 
advertisements were a significant factor in the quick rebound.
437
 Overall, national sales 
and consumption took until 1962 to return to pre-scare levels.
438
 Industry diversification 
efforts and new marketing campaigns were required in all major markets to return 
consumer demand to pre-scare levels.
439
 
After 1962, subsequent scares and broadening anti-carcinogen legislation blurred 
the impact of the cranberry scare.  The 1962 publication of Rachel Carson‘s Silent 
Spring, the 1970 creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, and shifts in 
scientific outlook, such as the push toward de-minimis tolerances and human analogue 
testing each moved the discussion in a new direction. The FDA continued to seek out 
and ban chemicals falling under the umbrella restriction of the Delaney clause. 
Supported by the Delaney-like clauses in the Color Additives Amendment, the FDA 
banned DDT in 1962, cyclamates in 1969, and many other chemicals through 1997. 
440
 
(See Appendix A for a more detailed chronological timeline of the scare) 
The alar scare in 1989 is a good example of how similar some subsequent scares 
were to the cranberry scare. Alar (daminozide), a chemical ripening agent manufactured 
by the Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc., had been in use since 1968. Alar was first shown to 
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cause cancer in laboratory animals 1973. After many rounds of questions, tests, 
temporary industry bans, and apple industry statements that alar was harmless, CBS-
TV‘s 60 Minutes presented a story to the public. Based on a report prepared by an 
environmental group, the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC), the TV story 
cited the danger of cancer from prolonged exposure to the chemical‘s residues and made 
the concern over the chemical into a crisis. The story caused widespread public fear, 
national bans and recalls of apples, calls for increased legislation to protect the public, 
and eventually led to the abandonment of the chemical.
441
 
Anxieties over food adulteration and governmental control were set firmly in the 
public‘s consciousness by repeated scares. Americans became desensitized to potential 
dangers and used to simply adding another item to the list of things to fear. The result 
has been a very predictable response to media coverage of a potential cancer hazard. 
Scientific, medical, and public institutions have continued to educate the public 
concerning the nature of additives, their food, and the results of exposure to various 
risks, but scares have continued to occur. Subsequent scares have reflected in part the 
continued presence of the anxiety that helped generate the cranberry scare.
442
 
The current social climate is very similar to that of 1959 and the cranberry scare. 
Food fear is alive and well, and although the societal stresses and fears have changed, 
they still generate a similar environment of anxiety.
443
 Loss of global habitats, ever more 
complex chemicals, irradiated foods, and the new addition of genetically engineered 
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materials add to concerns over food purity. At the same time, political unrest, economic 
instability, and the threat of destruction by implacable and often invisible foes haunt our 
thoughts and media coverage.
444
 Recent episodes of food contamination have included 
melamine in foods from China, repeated E. coli contaminations of spinach and other pre-
washed salads, and salmonella in peanut butter.
445
 
A common factor between the cranberry scare and most subsequent scares was 
technology in all of its various incarnations. Technology has served as both cause and 
catalyst in many scares. Misused technology caused the scare; media technology spread 
the fear, and testing technology worked to identify and solve the problem. Later scares 
such as the fear that electric blankets might cause cancer in children or that cell phones 
might cause brain cancer reflected the general fear that electromagnetic fields are 
harmful. These scares have also shown that society‘s fear of cancer is generalized, rather 
than being tied specifically to chemicals in food.
446
 
The cranberry scare and other scares have occurred in part because of the ease of 
transmitting the information about the perceived problem, coupled with public 
misunderstanding or fear. The faster the information reaches a large number of people, 
the more intense the potential reaction.
447
 The media have consistently played a pivotal 
role in distributing the information and have often been the means by which information 
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eventually reached the public to calm the fears.
448
 The long series of scares and the 
similarity of the circumstances surrounding each suggest why the cranberry scare has 
failed to inspire more than brief historical comment in the secondary literature. Although 
the cranberry scare was the first event of its kind, the series of scares since 1959 
provided an ever-expanding recipe for activating the fears present in the public 
consciousness, making that first scare seem small and inconsequential in comparison. 
The Delaney clause attempted to coordinate scientific understanding of cancer 
and chemicals with legislative control over additives in food. Flemming placed the 
clause directly in the path of scientific judgment during a period when societal fears and 
scientific uncertainty dominated the discussion of cancer.
449
 
The short-term perception in the media of the first test of the Delaney clause was 
of a successful defense of public health, with a high cost for the cranberry industry.
450
 
The long-term perception of the clause was less positive. Debate over the efficacy and 
scientific foundations of the clause began before its passage in 1958 and continued 
through the 1990s.
451
 The controversial repeal of the Delaney clause as part of the 1996 
Food Quality and Protection Act was both a victory for scientific methodology and a 
bending to industrial pressures. The removal of the Delaney clause replaced zero 
tolerance with scientific judgment and reopened the door for the FDA and food industry 
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to make judicious use of small amounts of potentially carcinogenic chemicals. The act 
replaced the Delaney clause with a new ―negligible risk‖ definition of safety: ―the 
Administrator has determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result 
from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated 
dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable information.‖452 The 
1996 act also emphasized integrated pest management (IPM) practices to battle pest 
plants and insects, and it focused on risk assessment based on scientific judgment.
453
 The 
EPA set a difficult task for itself by replacing the zero tolerance of the Delaney clause 
with the often subjective judgments of science. 
Before 1959, bog maintenance and health was the focus of most cranberry 
research done at university and state research stations. Since the 1960s, they have 
instigated movement away from the use of chemicals toward alternative methods such as 
encouraging predator insects and animals. Industry-wide best management practices 
manuals (BMP) have become standard repositories of the latest research and 
methodologies. The regularly updated notebooks cover the latest research in bog 
development, water management, planting, weeding, insect control, harvesting, 
productivity, and marketing. To minimize the use of chemicals, most bog managers use 
integrated pest management practices, which are coordinated efforts to prevent and 
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eliminate insect and weed infestation. Periodic flooding, hand weeding, insect trapping 
and counting, and the encouragement of predator species are parts of any good IPM.
454
 
An effect of the cranberry scare and similar events has been substantial growth in 
the science of chemical testing and evaluation. The need to detect smaller amounts and 
to evaluate increasingly complex systems of effects stimulated the science of testing. As 
the science of analysis has improved, understanding of the nature and effects of 
chemicals in the environment and in humans has grown. Legal tolerances have been 
raised or lowered in keeping with the improved understanding of how the chemicals 
affect us. Thus observing the Delaney clause resulted in increasingly stringent guidelines 
and tolerances that make it difficult to avoid some degree of contamination in almost 
anything. The increase in testing sensitivity generated one of the primary arguments for 
repeal of the Delaney clause; specifically that strict application of the law undermined 
the ability of the food and agricultural industries to produce almost any foodstuff that 
was free of some degree of contamination.
455
 
Disagreement over the applicability of animal testing to human physiology 
continued to be a major factor in subsequent scares. Almost all of the scares between 
1959 and 1997 resulted from extrapolation of animal test data to humans. Similar 
procedures remain in effect today, although some scientific analyses were criticized 
when applied to human problems. The central difficulty in arguing against the 
applicability of animal testing was in suggesting an alternative. The extremely long time 
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spans required in human and chimpanzee or monkey studies made them non-feasible. 
Without the freedom to do direct human testing, which was strictly controlled by 
medical ethics and FDA rules, there was no alternative that provided a clear analog to 
human physiology.
456
 
As the cranberry scare receded into memory and numerous subsequent scares-- 
including scares about pesticide and herbicide residues, sweeteners, automotive 
emissions, and electromagnetic energy-- took its place, administrative efforts began to 
drift away from strict adherence to the Delaney clause toward a de-minimis perspective. 
Creation of the EPA in 1970 and its close association to the FDA added new energy and 
focus to chemical testing and management, but the Delaney clause remained in effect.
457
 
The EPA began using a de-minimis or negligible-risk interpretation in its assessment 
procedures in the late 1980s, but a Federal court ruling, Les v. Reilly (9
th
 Cir. 1992), 
citing the specific and clear intent of the clause, forced a return to Delaney restrictions in 
1992.
458
 
Since the repeal of the Delaney clause, regulatory agencies have focused 
increasingly on more flexible solutions to toxicity evaluation. The most recent change in 
administrative perspective involved a 2008 cooperative effort between the EPA and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to re-think the standard methodology for testing 
potentially toxic substances. The joint agency project combined the EPA‘s testing 
mandate with technological resources of the NIH‘s Chemical Genomic Center. The 
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project incorporated computer and robotic technologies into the testing and analysis 
phases to better identify the mechanisms of biological activity, to better prioritize 
chemicals in need of evaluation, and to develop improved models for the response of 
human systems to the chemicals. Their interaction might eventually end reliance on 
inherently limited and flawed animal testing.
459
  
Cranberries in 1959 were a marginal fruit crop in the American diet, averaging 
only 0.3% of the annual U.S fruit crop between 1945 and 1965.
460
 Although popular 
holiday fare, they were not part of the regular American diet at other times of the year. 
The cranberry scare brought cranberries and the cranberry industry to the national stage. 
Despite the negative portrayal of the industry and its berries, the notoriety may have 
been positive. The broad advertising and the marketing push sponsored by the USDA 
immediately after the scare spread a great deal more information about cranberries and 
their uses than their re-established safety. Likewise, existing plans for Ocean Spray 
development and marketing of new product lines, such as juice products and dried 
berries, fell perfectly into place after the scare. 
The new cranberries were no longer just for Thanksgiving and holidays, but for 
all year round.
461
 Cookbooks provided possible evidence of the positive turnaround of 
cranberries after the scare. Although cranberry recipes and remedies were common in 
pre-scare books, the number of cranberry-related recipes increased throughout the 1970s 
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along with the number of cranberry products on store shelves.
462
 Although certainly not 
directly attributable to the scare itself, this phenomenon can be attributed largely to post-
scare marketing developments within the cranberry industry and more effective 
utilization of the crop. 
The cranberry ―scare‖ defined the term as part of the cascade of developments 
surrounding the regulation of chemicals in food. The cranberry scare was exactly that, a 
scare. No one became sick or died as a result of the contamination, the FDA did its job 
according to the law, and the cranberry industry survived and eventually became 
stronger than ever. The events of the scare set the stage for future events, including 
further scares, scientific developments in toxicity testing and analysis, and shifts in how 
Americans look at chemicals in their food and environment. 
The environmental movement found its roots in this period of discovery and 
anxiety. Several scares and increasing concerns over chemicals in the environment and 
food supply inspired Rachel Carson‘s seminal work, Silent Spring, three years later. The 
book has often been cited as the beginning of the environmental movement, but the 
cranberry scare led the way in demonstrating that chemical regulation was a serious 
problem needing a solution.
463
 Although the cranberry scare is not mentioned in Silent 
Spring, Carson definitely took part and gained valuable knowledge from the 
proceedings. She attended the November 18
th
 meeting between the FDA and cranberry 
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industry representatives. She was very impressed by the tenacity and preparedness of 
Secretary Flemming, but was very disapproving of the testimony of industry scientists, 
such as Dr. Astwood.
464
 As a precursor to larger scares and bigger problems, such as 
those concerning DDT and radioactive fallout, the relatively mild effects of the 
cranberry scare did not support her thesis of contamination and destruction.
465
 
The cranberry scare was the first food scare to demonstrate the vulnerability of 
the food industry as well as American society to misinformation, lack of administrative 
preparation, and shifting public perception of food concerns. It opened the eyes of both 
industry and government to issues concerning chemicals in food that had been building 
over the previous decades, and it provided a sense of what future controversies would be 
like. Government and media remained on alert for similar problems, and the public 
remained tense and ready to react to potential threats. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
CRANBERRY SCARE TIMELINE 
 
January 1956 - FDA becomes aware of the use of the herbicide aminotriazole on 
cranberry bogs and began investigation into residues and tolerance levels. 
 
March 1957 – USDA supports application for use of aminotriazole on a no-residue basis. 
 
April 1957 – FDA refuses no-residue application based on inadequate research data. 
 
July 1957 – NCA recognizes aminotriazole had been used during 1957 growing season 
in New England, but investigation showed no contamination. 
 
October 1957 – FDA investigates reports of aminotriazole use in Washington and 
Oregon regions resulting in segregation of 2,460,000 lbs (approximately 30% of the 
crop) pending tolerance application. 
 
January 1958 – USDA registers aminotriazole for cranberries on a no-residue basis, to 
be applied only 7-10 days after harvest. 
 
February 1958 – Cranberry industry institutes educational program about aminotriazole 
use, which continued through October 1959. 
 
April 1958 – FDA receives application for a 0.7 ppm tolerance from American Paint and 
Chemical (AmChem), to be applied no later than 10 days after harvest. 
 
May 1958 – FDA tables AmChem petition pending results of toxicity studies. 
 
January 1959 – NCA requests information from FDA concerning application. 
 
February 1959 – AmChem Products, Inc. and American Cyanamid Co. file a joint 
petition for a 1 ppm tolerance on aminotriazole for apples, pears, and cranberries. 
 
April 1959 – FDA tables NCA petition concerning the quarantined berries and pre-
harvest aminotriazole use due to lack of data. 
 
May 1959 – FDA Division of Pharmacology concludes that tolerances should not be set 
because studies showed that aminotriazole is a carcinogen. These results were later 
confirmed by American Cyanamid studies. 
 
June 1959 – Amchem and American Cyanamid withdraws their application. FDA begins 
working to improve the method for detecting aminotriazole residues to increase testing 
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efficiency. NCA institutes industry-wide ban on aminotriazole whether it was used 
according to the instructions or not. 
 
July 1959 – FDA begins investigation into possible contamination of the 1958 and 1959 
crops. 
 
September 1959 – FDA develops evidence on further aminotriazole use in the Oregon 
area. The NCA provides affidavits from each member grower certifying no 
aminotriazole use after the June ban. Berries from non-certified members are not 
accepted. Independent growers are unaffected by the ban. 
 
October 1959 – FDA increases investigations in Washington and Oregon with the 
discovery of aminotriazole use. All suspect lots are set aside, and the FDA advises the 
NCA and growers that interstate shipment of contaminated berries would be illegal. 
 
November 9 1959– Secretary Flemming holds a formal press conference announcing the 
discovery of contaminated cranberries and begins the scare. Newspapers, radio and 
television around the U.S. pick up the story. 
 
November 17 1959- Flemming reports berries cleared as of November 17 to White 
House. Slightly more than one fifth of one percent (0.022%) of tested samples was found 
contaminated.  
 
November 18 1959– FDA and cranberry industry conference sets out a labeling plan to 
clear berries. 
 
November 19 1959– Ocean Spray releases cranberry industry plan to sort cleared berries 
and solve the aminotriazole problem to the press. 
 
December 8 1959– Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce meets to discuss the cranberry problem. 
FDA, HEW and USDA personnel testify along with industry representatives. 
 
January 1960 – White House begins an internal investigation into the concerns of 
chemicals in food looks specifically at the interrelationship of FDA and HEW and 
known carcinogenic problems, such as the animal growth hormone diethylstilbesterol. 
 
January 26 1960– Secretary Flemming reports to the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce concerning the cranberry scare and concerns over diethylstilbesterol. 
 
January through May 1960– Panel on Food Additives, led by Dr. George Kistiakowski, 
looks at the scare and sought ways to avoid similar events in the future. The panel 
researches and works to produce a detailed report, which is completed in May.  
 
  
173 
May 9 1960 – The cranberry payment program begins. The program requires significant 
paperwork, including inspection records proving that berries were uncontaminated and a 
formal invoice from the cooperative or processor managing the crop. Contaminated 
berries had to be destroyed. 
 
July 12 1960 – The Color Additives Amendment takes effect. The bill contains a 
Delaney-like clause similar in wording and effect to the original. 
 
1961 – Congress amends the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (1937) to allow 
marketing orders for cranberries. The Cranberry Marketing Committee uses producer 
allotments and withholding programs to eliminate the carryover problem. 
 
1996 –The Food Quality Protection Act (1996) repeals the Delaney clause. The act 
replaces the Delaney clause with a new ―negligible risk‖ definition of safety, effectively 
returning scientific judgment to the forefront in determining residue safety. 
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APPENDIX B 
SUBSEQUENT CANCER SCARES BASED ON THE DELANEY CLAUSE
466
 
 
DDT – 1962 – carcinogen tests and hypotheses led to worldwide ban on DDT 
 
Cyclamates – 1969 – testing led to Delaney ban of cyclamates 
 
DES in beef – 1972 – ban resulted from cancer at higher dose levels 
 
Nitrites – 1972 – breakdown products thought to generate tumors 
 
Red dye number 2 – 1976 – animal testing led to Delaney ban 
 
Saccharin – 1977 – animal testing led to required labeling which was repealed in 2000 
 
2, 4, 5-T – 1979 – second herbicide banned under Delaney 
 
Coffee and pancreatic cancer – 1981 – data linked coffee and cancer 
 
EDB – 1983 – automotive emission residues in groundwater caused alarm 
 
Alar – 1989 – television coverage of chemical use caused scare 
 
Electric blankets – 1989 – brain tumors feared from electromagnetic fields 
 
Benzene in Perrier – 1990 – minute quantities of carcinogen produced huge fears 
 
Asbestos in schools – 1993 – fear for schoolchildren prompted a new abatement industry 
 
Cellular phones – 1993 – brain tumors feared from electromagnetic signals 
  
 
466 Lieberman, Kwon, and American Council on Science and Health, Facts Versus Fears: A Review of the Greatest 
Unfounded Health Scares of Recent Times, 5-51. The ACSH, funded largely by corporate donations, is a consumer 
education organization with strong political motivations in the environmental movement. The source is used only as a 
list of cancer scare events, their basic motivations and dates. 
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